JPRS-WER-86-022 28 February 1986

# West Europe Report

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# WEST EUROPE REPORT

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POLITICAL BELGIUM

### POLL ON POLITICAL LEADERS, GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES

Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 27 Dec 85 p 2

[Text] If there were legislative elections next Sunday, for which party would you vote?

Still So Many Undecided

	Sep	tember	De	ecember	
	Na	tion	Flanders	Wallonie	Brussels
Answered	72	72	73	71	70
Did not answer	28	28	27	29	30

One finds a certain homogeneity in the country, a little as if the elections had determined behaviors: more than one Belgian out of four refuses to answer the poll, either out of indecision or for personal reasons. But, rather curiously, the figure, which is very high, is the same as before the elections...

Flanders: Stable, Very Stable

	December poll	October elections
CVP	34.8	34.6
SP	24.2	23.7
PVV	17.8	17.3
VU	12.1	12.7
AGALEV	6.0	6.1
Others	5.1	5.6

Simulations are not just polls. First it is a question of asking "For whom did you vote," then of comparing the results of this question with those of the elections and, only finally, of analyzing the results to the question "For whom are you going to vote?"

So, up to September 1985, we were working with the results of the 1981 elections with all the "memorization" problems which can be posed especially when two other elections (local and European) intervened. Today the basis of the simulation is really the results of 13 October 1985. Barely 2 months ago, then...

In this spirit, one will especially recall that the VU is continuing its downward movement and the PVV its upward tendency which, in our polls, both began in March 1985. For the rest, the electorate is more than stable and the CVP remains undoubtedly number one.

In Flanders, the situation of the majority is still more comfortable: in the October elections, it received 51.9 percent of the vote; our December poll gives it 52.6 percent.

Wallonie: A First Warning

	December pol1	October elections
PS	39.5	39.4
PRI	23.8	24.2
PSC	22.1	22.6
ECOLO	6.3	6.2
Others	8.3	7.6

No significant differences, but a preliminary warning to the Social-Christians and the liberal Walloons who are losing some of their strength. That is why the majority is drawing back a little: in the October elections it had 46.8 percent and in our poll has only 45.9 percent.

Brussels: The Majority Moves Forward

	December pol1	October elections
PRI	19.9	19.7
CVP	14.7	14.6
PS	11.9	11.3
SP	8.6	8.7
PVV	8.4	8.0
PSC	7.2	7.0
ECOLO-AGALEV	6.3	6.3
VU	6.3	6.4
FDF	6.2	8.3
Others	10.5	9.7

One single significant result in an ocean of stability: Although the basis of calculation is the October 1985 results, the FDF is falling back--to the benefit of the PS especially--to the same level it has had in our polls since the beginning of 1985. A little as if in the polling booth there had been a sort of French-speaking reflex for some, but which disappears shortly thereafter?

Or because the new divisions in the party make its last square unbearable? Note also the PVV's progress: a preliminary "Annemie effect..." The four groups of the majority progress in concert. The October elections had given them 49.3 percent. They are getting 50.2 percent in our December poll.

Would you say that your opinion is rather good or bad concerning each of the following political groups?

	Aut	ımn			í	Wint	er			
	The Nation			Flanc	lers	Walle	onie	Bruss	sels	
	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
P.S.	24	45	25	47	13	55	42	35	30	43
P.S.C.	15	43	17	42	12	49	25	27	16	50
P.R.L.	21	49	20	49	12	59	25	35	38	43
F.D.F.	4	54	4	55	1	68	3	34	16	51
S.P.	28	36	26	37	39	32	4	43	28	43
C.V.P.	21	40	22	40	33	30	7	50	14	53
P.V.V.	14	50	15	49	22	44	3	55	14	54
V.U.	17	45	14	44	23	30		60	9	59
ECOLO/AGALEV	26	34	25	33	25	35	25	29	25	38

The essential information here is that the splendors of the electoral campaign have not worn out or irritated the voters. In fact, the large parties are not penalized. It is the Socialists and the Ecolos who get the best ratings and the liberals who get the worst.

#### Popularity of Politicians

For each of the following people, will you please tell us if you hope to see him exercise an important political influence in the coming months?

Forty names were put forth to the people polled throughout the country. Vic Anciaux, Philippe Busquin, Willy Claes, Georges Clerfayt, Daniel Coens, Andre Cools, Francois-Xavier de Donnea, Herman De Croo, Jean-Luc De Haene, Jean-Maurice, Dehousse, Gerard Deprez, Patrick De Wael, Mark Eyskens, Gaston Geens, Jean Gol, Michel Hansenne, Jose Happart, Wilfried Martens, Jacqueline Mayence, Philippe Maystadt, Louis Michel, Philippe Monfils, Philippe Moureaux, Anne-Marie Neyts, Roger Nols, Charles-Ferdinand Nothomb, Hugo Schiltz, Henri Simonet, Antoinette Spaak, Guy Spitaels, Frank Swaelen, Jean-Louis Thys, Leo Tindemans, Louis Tobback, Robert Urbain, Luc Van den Brande, Karel Van Miert, Eric Van Rompuy, Guy Verhofstadt, Melchior Wathelet. Removed from the list were: Mssrs Chabert, Coeme, Gendebien, Glinne, Hatry and Hendrickx. Added were: Mssrs de Donnea, Coens, Busquin, De Wael, Thys, and Urbain.

Let us recall that all the names on the list are quoted in order to the people polled. They must indicate by "yes" or "no" if they hope that the person will exercise important responsibilities in the coming months. Thus one sees that 50 percent of Belgians hopes that Mr Martens will continue to make his mark on politics in the coming months.

Nation: Mr De Croo's Big Advantage

	Summer	Autumn	Winter	Difference
Martens	46	50	50	
Tindemans	37	38	40	+ 2
Eyskens	35	35	36	+ 1
Claes	33	34	34	
Van Miert	. 38	35	33	- 2
De Croo	23	25	32	+ 7
Geens	23	25	25	
Schiltz	20	21	23	+ 2
Swaelens	17	19	22	+ 3
Verhofstadt	16	18	21	+ 3
Coens	P.N.	P.N.	21	P.N.
Anciaux	22	21	21	
Maystadt	18	17	19	+ 2
Dehaene	17	19	19	
<b>Tobback</b>	19	19	19	
Neyts	P.N.	P.N.	18	P.N.
Van Rompuy	16	17	18	+ 1
Gol	21	18	17	- 1
Van den Brande	16	17	17	- 1
Spitaels	18	18	16	- 2

#### P.N. = Not noted

On the national level, Mr Martens remains stable: If one disregards the one-third of the people who did not answer, one can say that one out of two Belgians is satisfied with the fact that Mr Martens has been called to succeed himself.

Mr Tindemans has been moving up regularly since the summer, which shows that he still has many supporters.

Mr Van Miert, despite his entry into Parliament, is constantly falling. The president of the SP was really the missile man, but he has not yet found a new field on which to show off his "in" look.

The big winner of this national ranking is certainly Mr Herman De Croo who has been moving up spectacularly since last summer. He would have made an excellent president of the PVV, but he can render more service within the government where he is really considered as a "manager" minister. Mr Verhofstadt, who became vice prime minister, continues forging ahead and currently finds himself in the middle of the picture.

One will note that another party president, Frank Swaelen, without becoming minister, is gaining in popularity while his Flemish liberal colleague, Annemie Neyts, is making her entry into our ranking.

As for Mr Maystadt, he is presently the most popular French-speaking politician in the country. He is even ahead of Vice-Prime Minister Jean Gol.

Wallonie: Mr Martens, Top "Walloon"

	Summer	Autumn	Winter	Difference
Martens	32	38	38	
Spitaels	37	39	37	- 2
Maystadt	32	31	34	+ 3
Go1	36	33	31	- 2
Happart	33	32	30	- 2
Dehousse	29	30	30	Gapt 090
Wathelet M.	29	29	30	+ 1
Deprez	21	29	29	-
Cools	23	26	27	+ 1
Busquin	P.N.	P.N.	24	P.N.
Monfils	P.N.	22	24	+ 2
Michel L.	21	24	23	- 1
De Croo	P.N.	P.N.	22	P.N.
Tindemans	P.N.	22	22	
Nothomb	21	24	22	- 2

P.N. = Not noted

The big event in the southern part of the country is that, for the first time, the coveted title of "Mr Wallonie" goes to a Fleming: Mr Wilfried Martens. He was already first in Flanders and Brussels; now the prime minister has seized all three crowns. He is indisputably the country's political number one.

Mr Spitaels, president of the PS, is losing two points, which may mean that the party's failure--in terms of parliamentary seats in any case--may have harmed the socialist president.

Mr Cools, who had made some reasonably participationist remarks (about merging institutions, for example) comes out better and rises one point.

One should notice the nice jump made by Mr Philippe Maystadt who has managed to surpass Mr Gol by 3 percent. In popularity, then, it is the Social Christian leader of Charleroi who stands out as the most popular person in the government after Mr Martens.

Mr Herman De Croo pulls off a nice breakthrough in Wallonie, while Mr Nothomb continues to stagnate at the bottom of our table.

Messrs Happart, Dehousse and Wathelet are currently on the same line, with the burgomaster of Fourons always on the side and the new president of the Walloon executive continuing his constant climb.

The two presidents, Michel and Deprez, are enjoying the status quo.

Note the disappearance into the outer shadows of Mrs Spaak and Mssrs Claes and Simonet.

Flanders: Mr Swaelen's Nice Rise

	Summer	Autumn	Winter	Difference
Martens	55	59	58	- 1
Tindemans	51	52	54	+ 2
Eyskens	52	52	54	+ 2
Van Miert	59	56	53	<b>-</b> 3
Claes	43	43	44	+ 1
Geens	39	41	41	
Schiltz	38	39	40	+ 1
Anciaux	39	39	38	- 1
De Croo	32	37	38	+ 1
Swaelen	29	32	36	+ 4
Coens	P.N.	P.N.	36	P.N.
Verhofstadt	P.N.	P.N.	36	P.N.
Tobback	32	31	32	+ 1
Dehaene	29	31	30	- 1
Neyts	P.N.	P.N.	29	P.N.
Van Rompuy	25	29	29	

#### P.N. = Not noted

In Flanders, Mr Martens has dropped back by one small point. It is true that he is still pushing the 60 percent mark.

He is follwed, four lengths back, by Mssrs Tendemans and Eyskens, both of whom moved up two points. As for Mr Van Miert, he once again drops back by three points and is even surpassed by Mr Claes, which seems to indicate that the Van Miert effect really affected only the European voting.

A very significant fact is the impressive rise of Frank Swaelen who, from summer to winter, has risen seven points. His attitude during the handing out of the ministerial portfolios was no doubt appreciated as not lacking in grandeur: in order to avoid tearing his party apart, he accepted remaining under Rue des Deux Eglises orders. This responsible attitude was judged courageous by Flemish public opinion.

Note that the nice scores of Mssrs Coens, Verhofstadt and Annemie Neyts who assumed the presidency of the PVV seems well accepted.

There is still no French-speaking politician among the male and female politicians preferred by the Flemings.

Brussels: M. Martens Takes Off

	Summer	Autumn	Winter	Difference
Martens	41	43	49	+ 6
Go1	42	39	38	- 1
Simonet	19	34	31	- 3
De Croo	27	26	29	+ 3
Maystadt	26	25	28	+ 3
Tindemans	23	24	28	+ 4
Spitaels	28	29	26	- 3
Eyskens	25	25	26	+ 1
De Donnea	P.N.	21	25	+ 4
Spaak	23	24	24	
Claes	22	23	24	+ 1
Nols	30	29	24	- 5
Michel L.	P.N.	22	24	+ 2
Van Miert	24	23	23	
Cools	P.N.	P.N.	22	P.N.
Moureaux Ph.	22	20	20	
Deprez	19	20	20	
Happart	20	20	19	- 1
Nothomb	22	20	19	- 1
Wathelet	P.N.	P.N.	19	P.N.

P.N. = Not noted

The two most spectacular Brussels results are registered by Mssrs Martens and Nols: the former is literally taking off while the latter does more than begin a serious slide.

Mssrs Gol (a little bit) and Simonet (more so) are dropping back while Mr de Donnea is becoming a real personality in the Brussels liberal camp with President Michel. As in Wallonie, Mr Maystadt is emerging as the foremost French-speaking Social Christian personality in Brussels.

Mssrs De Croo, Tindemans and yskens show clearly that the Flemish political world is highly rated in Brussels.

On the Socialist side, Guy Spitaels seems to take the Socialists' "defeat" on 13 October but Philippe Moureaux keeps his 20 points and, as in Wallonie, Andre Cools does not give the impression of being a finished man.

Government: What Confidence!

To solve Belgium's current problems, do you have confidence or no confidence in Mr Martins' government?

	he Nation		
Complete confidence	16		
Rather confident	29		
Not too confident	13		
Not at all confident	20		
No opinion	22		

When one compares this with the polls taken in the past, one gets:

	Winter 1985	Autumn 1985	Summer 1985	Spring 1985	Winter 1984	Autumn 1984	Summer 1984
Confidence	45	37	39	34	36	31	33
No confidence	33	37	36	37	37	39	40

In spite of some worries voiced by the press and the parties on the future fate of the Martens VI government, the people have great confidence in him and even grant him credit which surpasses all those who were recorded in our preceding polls: 45 percent "positive votes" is a lot and is even an enormous share, all the more so since only one Belgian in three is openly hostile.

Priority to Terrorism and Unemployment

What actions do you think the government should currently make priorities?

	Winter	Autumn	Summer	Spring
Fight unemployment	79	79	79	79
Lower taxes	60	62	61	61
Fight rise in prices	57	58	58	57
Fight against violence and				
insecurity	47	38	38	35
Settle the community problem				
once and for all	26	31	27	29
Improve education	26	30	26	27
Favor social peace	28	26	27	27
Solve immigrant worker problem	23	25	25	25

A dominant fact is the 9-point rise in the preoccupation over "fighting against violence and insecurity" which moves up to the fourth place among priorities. The Belgian police's success in the CCC affair was not yet known at the time the poll was taken.

As for the rest, the worries remain constant, with the community problem losing ground, however.

In the matter of the fight against loss of purchasing power, is the government's action effective or not?

	Winter	Autumn	Summer	Spring
Very effective	2	2	2	2
Rather effective	12	9	9	7
Not very effective	25	26	26	30
Not at all effective	32	36	38	40
No opinion	29	27	25	21

In September a slight but steady improvement was noted. Today that movement is confirmed.

As concerns community relations, is the government's action effective or not?

	Winter	Autumn	Summer	Spring
Very effective	1	1	1	1
Rather effective	11	6	9	8
Not very effective	23	27	22	22
Not at all effective	25	35	29	31
No opinion	40	31	39	38

Here too the situation is in considerable flux compared to the pre-electoral period.

As concerns the fight against unemployment, is the government's action effective or not?

	Winter	Autumn	Summer	Spring
Very effective	5	3	9	2
Rather effective	27	14	19	18
Not very effective	12	17	18	18
Not at all effective	14	17	12	16
No opinion	42	49	49	54

Here again, one notes a considerable progression of positive opinions. Fifty-seven percent negative opinions obviously remains a real problem, but the tendency can be considered satisfactory.

As concerns European policy, is the government's action effective or not?

	Winter	Autumn	Summer	Spring
Very effective	2	1	1	1
Rather effective	16	11	11	8
Not very effective	27	28	28	21
Not at all effective	30	34	35	33
No opinion	25	26	25	37

It is confirmed that Belgium's current foreign policy finds wide support.

Concerning international policy, is the government's action effective or not?

	Winter	Autumn	Summer	Spring
Very effective	3	2	3	2
Rather effective	22	15	18	18
Not very effective	16	19	20	19
Not at all effective	16	15	16	10
No opinion	43	49	43	40

Mr Tindemans got very good scores on the "popularity" part...and his action is in fact well regarded in practice, with a constant upward trend.

This poll was carried out at the request of LA LIBRE BELGIQUE from 11 to 16 December 1985 by 76 pollsters from Marketing Unit, a firm specializing in market studies and opinion polls, from a sample of 1,579 Belgians age 18 and older, chosen according to quotas of sex, age and social class (margin of error, plus or minus 2.5). The poll was carried out either in person or by telephone as follows: 547 in Flanders, 537 in Wallonie and 495 in Brussels-Hal-Vilvorde. The results were weighed according to the importance of the regions of the country. Affiliations: Esomar, Febelmar.

9895/8309 CSO: 3619/16 POLITICAL

# ECOLOGICAL PARTY SPOKESMAN ON REGIONAL ISSUES

Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 20 Dec 86 p 4

[Interview with Paul Lannoye, federal secretary of the Ecological Movement; date and place not specified]

[Text] Following is the text of the interview given to us by Paul Lannoye, federal secretary of the Ecological Movement. First, he reviewed the way in which contacts were developed between the PSC, the PRL, and the opposition parties (PS and Ecological Party), following the elections on 13 October 1985.

Paul Lannoye said: "We met Deprez and Michel for the first time after they had been assigned the task of forming the Walloon Regional Executive. In the same way we consulted Spitaels for the PS and Clerfayt for the FDF. At the time I only repeated what I had already said during the elections campaign. Our participation in a regional executive body was conditioned (and, moreover, is still conditioned) on meeting a certain number of prior conditions. If these points are not taken into consideration, there is no use in talking."

[Question] What were these prior conditions?"

[Answer] There are four of them. The first one involves adopting a procedure as close as possible to a popular initiative referendum. We also rejected supervision of the communes by the Walloon Regional Executive for any reason, although we accepted continued supervision on legal questions. The Ecological Movement continues to demand an immediate end to political appointments in the administration and was opposed to the reintegration of those whose appointments would eventually be rejected by the Council of State. Another prior condition is the halting of major public works programs (dams, super highways, etc).

We are opposed to the issuance of a permit to construct any new nuclear powered electricity generating plant.

Once these prior conditions were accepted, we were ready to discuss a program. However, Deprez and Michel did not answer us, and they did not provide a response to Spitaels and Clerfayt, either.

# A Little Help

[Question] What specific demands and offers did the majority make to you after preparing its program?

[Answer] The PSC told us: "Here is our program. We want you to give us a little help." In response for such help the Ecological Movement would receive the position of ombudsman for the Walloon Region. That is the kind of booby trap which the PSC offered us. For the Ecological Movement there was no question of providing any support after reading their program, which we considered unfortunate.

The program for the Walloon Region is even worse than the one for other areas. At the national level, at least, there is some substance, and some initiatives were announced. They fly in the face of what we want, but at least they are something. In the Walloon Region it is all one color and a low profile. There is nothing else, no original initiative.

[Question] In the PSC who handled the contacts with you and how were they set up?

[Answer] The contacts were handled by Gerard Deprez, the president of the PSC, and Jacques Lefevre, the secretary general of the party, who tried to get our support. There were never any official proposals. In a way they wanted us to play the role of troubleshooter. They also asked us to sign the document appointing the members of the Walloon Regional Executive. They needed 53 votes and they only had 52. They asked us for just one signature at first and four counter-signatures later on. For us this was out of the question, since we had voted against dropping Van Overstraeten.

Therefore, their proposals remained rather vague. That didn't work out because they were talking in terms of positions, while we were talking in terms of a program. Therefore, we rejected any further debate and discussion. We didn't go away angry, but the whole thing began to smell. If they still want to negotiate seriously, let them begin by throwing their program into the waste basket.

[Question] Weren't you also asked to accept pairing (a system under which a member of the opposition abstains from voting to balance the absence of a member of the majority who is unavailable)?

[Answer] We have never accepted the idea of pairing. We reject this system because it permits, to some extent, simultaneously holding several elected positions.

# Paralysis

[Question] Was it always the PSC which contacted you? Didn't the PRL ever try to talk to you?

[Answer] No, only the PSC. No doubt that reflects the strategy of the PSC, which wanted to strengthen itself as against the PRL. The social christians tell people that they have good contacts with the Ecological Movement, even though these contacts don't amount to anything. There have just been a few telephone calls. As we are well brought up people and want to behave properly, we answer politely. However, as far as this is concerned, it is clear that the PRL tends to negotiate with the PS. Each party negotiates with the partner which it would like to have to strengthen itself against the other partner. That will quickly lead to paralysis, but that is not our problem.

[Question] You don't think much of this alliance?

[Answer] I think that this is too small a majority and that it will completely paralyze the work of the Walloon Regional Council, which didn't need that to be paralyzed in any case. I wonder how they are going to manage it: by presenting drafts of basic laws in the form of decrees?

It seems to me that the solution for them will be to establish as quickly as possible a traditional, tripartite alliance, because the PS is ready to rise to the bait in order to participate in the government. Or the Walloon Regional Executive and Council will remain in a state of institutionalized lethargy for 2 or 3 years. This would be even worse because then there would no longer be a Walloon Region, since there is some risk that there will no longer be a French-speaking community.

Stay on the Sidelines?

[Question] During such a period, what is the Ecological Movement going to do? Watch the proceedings from outside, stay on the sidelines?

[Answer] No. We will take the offensive and will present draft bills. These draft bills will work like knives. As the majority is weak, we will be able to test the good will of the parties of the majority on bills which we are interested in. We will also be able to see how the socialists behave. We will not attempt to paralyze things systematically, as the PS has said it will do.

If the majority presents a good proposal or a good draft bill, perhaps we will be sufficiently annoyed to vote for it (because they will have cheated to rally their majority), but we will support it even so.

[Question] The socialists and the ecologists together only have 51 votes, as opposed to 52 for the PSC-PRL alliance. It will be difficult to overturn them.

[Answer] Perhaps so. However, I see very clearly a type of problem where there could be differences of view within the majority: on the location of Walloon institutions, for example.

What will Gendebien and the PRL and PSC deputies from Namur do when the draft decree by Anselme, a socialist, stating that Namur is the capital of Wallonia, comes up for discussion? The majority runs the risk of breaking up over this problem. We will only support a progressive alternative on condition that it is based on a specific draft bill which we find suitable. Because although we are not prepared to play the role of a link for the PSC-PRL alliance, neither will we be a steppingstone for the PS.

# A California Mirage

[Question] What do you find particularly shocking in the Walloon program?

[Answer] First, there is the absence of detail in the policy for Wallonia. Then they are bringing out all of the usual cliches on new technologies and on international competitiveness. This is the California mirage in Walloon terms. The program also ignores the problems which we consider important, such as energy, waste disposal, and the whole environmental policy. There is practically nothing in it.

Did the two partners in the alliance want to have this kind of empty program in order to leave the door open to something else? Perhaps so. In our view this program does not provide even a basis for discussion. Of course, we are ready to make concessions to ensure that what we want will move forward. We are not totalitarians. Even so, our strength is small, compared with the traditional parties. Well, we can goad them on. If there were a series of points in the program which we considered important, that could have been the subject for a debate which would end in our supporting the program.

Another problem is the lack of regional resources. Will the forthcoming executive authority play the role of the man who has power but who doesn't have the cash to pay for what he wants, as Dehousse did?

[Question] And the program for the French community—do you see any merits in it?

[Answer] In terms of the French community we also see a series of choices which we think are very dubious, whether in terms of health or audiovisual facilities. One phrase in the agreed program caught our attention: it is said that it is necessary to protect the citizens against the waves of irrationalism carried by the media! That is all that they found it appropriate to say, particularly in terms of what is not the usual solution.

They also take a very commercial view of audiovisual facilities. We only agree with part of their reasoning. We also think that you don't have to institutionalize bureaucracy and waste. However, neither do we want to approve television commercials on Belgian Television [RTBF] without making sure that it will have the resources to carry out its public service program. There is no guarantee for that. However, not everyone shares the views of Monfils on the RTBF. I am less afraid of the PSC in that area. Therefore, I am simultaneously concerned but also optimistic.

An Individualist, a Trouble Maker

[Question] Who will be your partner in the French community?

[Answer] Their majority in the French community is hardly much more comfortable. Although they can count on the support of the deputies from the UDRT, they won't have the assistance of the FDF, whose strategy, no doubt, will be similar to that of the opposition. Furthermore, they have two people who are rather annoying and not very reliable in their majority: Simonet and Nols. The former is an individualist; the latter is a trouble maker.

[Question] And Gendebien?

[Answer] In the French community, no doubt there won't be any problems. Even so, the French community has become very loyal to the PSC. That won't help to make it appear that within the PSC there is a group called "the Walloon Democratic Alliance," which represents nothing at all.

[Question] Will the Ecological Movement constitute a technical group in the French community and with whom will it be allied?

[Answer] There are a lot of major moves afoot to try to form broader groups within the Walloon Council. We have been in contact with the FDF and the UDRT. The UDRT has rejected any alliance with us, and up to now no agreement has been reached with the FDF. We remain in favor of setting up a technical group with the small parties.

In our view there was no possibility of setting up such a group with a large party. That would be a political and no longer a technical group. When Antoinette Spaak decided to rejoin the PS in order to form a technical group with it, I thought that no newspaper would accept her explanation. She could very well choose our group, particularly as this has been suggested to her. Together the Ecological Movement and the FDF were numerous enough to be represented and have a vote in the committees, to have an administrator on the RTBF, and to have a seat in the associations linked closely or at some distance with the French community.

There have to be nine people to set up a so-called "technical" group. Seven ecologists and four FDF deputies would be enough. However, the debate is not over, since the FDF is not in a position to provide a united answer to our proposal.

5170

CSO: 3619/26

POLITICAL

SOCIAL DEMOCRATS PLAY MAJOR ROLE IN FORMING SECURITY POLICY

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 12 Dec 85 p 17

[Op Ed Article by Per Hasemann: "Security Policy of Social Democratic Party"]

[Text] It is being said time and again that it is the Social Democratic Party and not the government that decides Denmark's security policy, and that, of course, is entirely wrong.

Since 1901 it has been the policy that has been able to muster the majority of votes that has been the decisive policy, and it is still that way.

The Schluter government is formally and actually responsible for the security policy pursued at the moment.

It is true that the Social Democratic Party belongs to the present security policy majority which, of course, gives the party a contributory influence, and that is the way it should be.

It is further maintained that Denmark's security policy causes alarm both domestically and abroad. Well, it may cause alarm among some people, among others it may give rise to hope, it all depends on where and whom one asks the question.

If the government finds itself unable to pursue Denmark's security policy, then it is the government's own decision and not that of the Social Democratic Party.

If anybody should have got the idea that the security policy initiatives on the part of the Social Democratic Party these years are 'occasional manifestations,' tactically determined, a result of the fact that the party is in opposition, they are entirely mistaken.

Now as previously, the Social Democrats are pursuing the long-term aim of gradually making NATO and the Warsaw Pact superfluous as a result of the

pacification of our continent, and, naturally, does not have the least desire to jeopardize our liberty and security before then.

Danish Social Democrats do not take any pride in the sight of marching soldiers, Danish Social Democrats do not become enthusiastic at the sight of shining missiles and modern military aircraft. We regard our membership in NATO as a necessity. We regard the continuous armament as the result of a perverted outlook which confines its own logic.

It is little consolation for us here in the West that we shall certainly be in a position to involve the Soviet Union and others in an Armageddon.

The Danish Social Democratic Party wants for Denmark to appear within NATO not as naive or irresponsible but as a moderating, responsible and reliable nation.

The Social Democratic Party does not regard security policy as something that is solely associated with questions on matters such as alliance affiliation, military strategy and armament level, etc. The Social Democratic Party actually regards in the broadest sense relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as important elements in our total security policy, including trade agreements, cultural and scientific cooperations, sports, etc.

If P. L. Olgaard and others seem unable to understand the security policy concept of the Social Democratic Party, it may possibly be due to his scientific background, where the working method is based on logically determined reasoning and one is dealing with essentially predictable and thus regular processes. Security policy, however, involves people. Issues such as war and peace, arms limitations agreements, armament and disarmament cannot be meaningfully elucidated in an experimental set-up/(model) in a laboratory, nor laid down in a formula.

The security policy reality is, to a far greater extent, a question of psychology and biochemistry on the part of the decision makers actually involved.

The basis for their decisions has always been the result of quite general, very human considerations. It is, usually, not a question of considerations which merely to a certain extent are marked by scientifically methodical, logical or other forms of consistent thinking—if so, world history would have taken an entirely different course.

Indeed, even presidents and secretary-generals and their advisers, for that matter, are dependent upon the passions, with all their good and bad qualities, of quite ordinary people, and that is the real problem.

That is why the thinking (working method) of P.L. Olgaard and many other so-called experts appears as a sheer abstraction from reality, completely useless in political contexts in their constant search for logical reasoning and rational considerations.

Instead of P.L. Olgaard's 'classical logic,' the Social Democratic Party uses a more intuitive, more broadly complementary method in which multi-lateral relations with Eastern Europe, to a greater or smaller extent, form a confidence-inspiring part.

In security policy matters, we do not want to be trapped by any form of logical consequence.

It is probably no secret that the Social Democratic Party regards the constantly growing armaments spiral with suspicion and concern.

For 30 years, the two superpowers have been negotiating arms reductions, disarmament, arms limitation agreements, the total result of which has been that the two superpowers together now have at their disposal upwards of 50,000 nuclear warheads complete with launching devices—thus an entirely absurd situation.

To the same extent as it would not be wise to leave the issue of war and peace solely to generals, the Social Democratic Party does not either expect the two superpowers to be the ones in the next few years to advance and adopt revolutionary decisions.

It is a prerequisite for adoption of arms reduction and arms limitations agreements, etc., that the fundamental differences between the superpowers be reduced and preferably removed. The enormous stockpiles of arms symbolize solely the basic differences, they are, so to speak, symptoms of a pathological distrust and fear between the two alliance systems.

Attempts at radically reducing if not entirely removing nuclear and hydrogen arms simply will not succeed, that is tantamount to treating symptoms and will not cure the patient, it is the causes of the fear and the distrust that primarily have to be removed.

The big nations have to recognize their moral responsibility and abandon their obsolete power philosophies. World War II was a memento mori for all human civilization—the last chance—history awaits further developments.

Against the background of the lack of understanding on the part of the two superpowers of the fact that time works against mankind, the Danish Social Democratic Party will in the coming years and in cooperation with the other European Social Democratic Parties, subject Europe's security policy situation to a renewed and current evaluation. Denmark is a fully loyal member of NATO, but that is possible only if we honestly serve the cause of peace and that of our nations, they are the ones we want to secure, not NATO as an institution.

Just as we, from time to time, change our tactics in the economic policy area, the Social Democratic Party intends, in the coming years and with renewed force, to exploit every conceivable possibility of radically breaking the present armaments spiral.

In contrast to Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and others, the Social Democratic Party finds that it is for Denmark itself to formulate the Danish security policy interests—a right that we do not believe we have written off.

We are aware of the idea on the part of Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and others that our membership in NATO means that we have to passively approve of all of the ideas presented, but, at the same time, we ask them to appreciate our old bad habit of thinking for ourselves before taking action.

Denmark's possibilities of warmonger probably are not too great.

Our influence in Europe is, undoubtedly, far greater if we advocate the cause of peace, a right which is not reserved entirely for the Social Democrats.

Who can be so naive as to believe that Denmark via its membership in NATO will be in a position to decisively change, i.e. weaken the armament plans and strategy of the United States and others? Even Uffe Ellemann-Jensen knows that this is not feasible, so why all this concern. However, it probably is not so much the security policy as such in which Uffe Ellemann Jensen is interested, it is rather a question of a gamble on the general insecurity of the Danish electorate. We are not naive—we have no false illusions, but we have the desire, and we do not want to give up the hope, that it will some day be possible to free mankind from the threat of war. A threat which continues to undermine the economies of nations and to preserve the lack of balance and social freedom throughout the world.

The European Social Democratic Parties are quite aware of the fact that we here in Western Europe cannot beg our way to detente and peace but that we, on the contrary, regard the road of commons sense and moderation as the only possible road.

7262

CSO: 3613/45

POLITICAL

DENMARK/GREENLAND

GREENLAND MINISTRY PHASING DOWN, LARGER FOREIGN AFFAIRS ROLE

Greenland Affairs Ministry Reducing

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 15 Jan 86 p 12

[Article by Hans Jorgen Poulsen]

[Text] The expected dismantling of the Greenlandic Affairs Ministry has triggered a genuine exodus of ministry personnel. A report from the ministry shows that 38 employees resigned in 1985 and seven more will leave at the end of this month.

Job uncertainty at the Greenlandic Affairs Ministry is spreading. Almost every week brings new resignations in the wake of the 38 that occurred in 1985. It is the expected closing of the ministry as an independent entity that has triggered the exodus of personnel, most of whom are receiving employment in other governmental institutions and at various organizations.

End In 1987

The dismantling of the ministry is being handled by a working group under the leadership of consultant Asger Lund Sorensen of the Prime Minister's Office. According to plans, the ministry will cease to exist after the next regularly scheduled parliamentary elections, which are to be held in late 1987.

The Greenlandic Affairs Ministry has a total staff of 175 and, according to what BERLINGSKE TIDENDE learned from personnel chief Anne Ruben, some of the recently vacated positions must be filled in order for the ministry to carry out its necessary functions.

Attempting To Retain Staff

The ministry intends to retain its staff as long as the ministry exists, Anne Ruben stressed. She knows that many employees have already put in applications elsewhere and they seem to have a good chance of obtaining other jobs.

A report recently completed by the ministry on the personnel losses last year showed that the 38 persons who resigned included eight academics, 29 clerical

workers (five of whom went on pension), and one civil servant who chose early retirement. Seven more will leave at the end of January, including three academics and four clerical workers.

Tasks To Other Agencies

No direct dismissals from the ministry are planned. It is believed that at least some of the ministry's tasks can be transferred to other governmental agencies, especially matters that cannot be placed directly under the home rule government in Godthaab. Current plans are to divide the ministry's tasks among the Prime Minister's Office, which already has jurisdiction over the Faroe Islands, the Justice Ministry, and the Interior Ministry. Health care is expected to be the last area to be transferred to Greenland in 1990 to 1992.

Part Time Greenlandic Affairs Minister From 1988

The phasing down of the Greenlandic Affairs Ministry as the home rule government increases its sphere of activities will mean that, beginning in January 1988, the ministry will be managed by a part-time minister.

It has not yet been decided which minister will receive this task.

After several more years, around 1990-1992, the Greenlandic Affairs Ministry will have a staff of only eight to 10 persons. It will then be time for the Prime Minister's Office to assume responsibility for any remaining tasks involving Greenland, in the same manner that it now deals with matters involving the Faroe Islands.

This procedure was announced yesterday when Prime Minister Poul Schluter (Conservative Party), Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (Liberal Party), and Greenlandic Affairs Minister Tom Hoyem (Center-Democratic Party) held a "national assembly" with Prime Minister Jonathan Motzfeldt of Greenland and Prime Minister Atli Dam of the Faroe Islands.

The rate at which the Greenlandic Affairs Ministry is phased out as an independent entity will depend on whether or not the Greenlandic Technical Organization and government housing can be transferred to the home rule administration by the end of 1986.

One extremely hot topic in Danish-Greenlandic relations is the question of access to underground raw materials in Greenland.

Here the two sides differ sharply.

Discussions on this matter, which will be coordinated with the interest in this same matter on the part of the Faroe Islands, will begin when Tom Hoyem and Jonathan Motzfeldt meet on 17 January and will continue on 31 January in Godthaab, where the minister will also participate in the celebration of the 300th birthday of the priest Hans Egede.

#### Raw Materials Wealth Discussed

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 20 Jan 86 p 2

[Article: "Hoyem Discusses Raw Materials with Greenland"]

[Text] The utilization of underground raw materials in Greenland and revenues from them, which has been a taboo subject for years, was discussed yesterday during talks between Greenlandic Affairs Minister Tom Hoyem (Center-Democratic Party) and Greenlandic Prime Minister Jonathan Motzfeldt. "This topic has not been taken up since 1976 when Anker Jorgensen said that there was nothing to talk about—if Greenland wanted the revenues, then it could expect no subsidies from Denmark," Tom Hoyem told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE. Now we have made some progress and talks will continue later in the month in Godthaab. According to the minister, direct and indirect subsidies from Denmark to Greenland will amount to 2.3 million kroner in 1986.

## Increased Foreign Affairs Role

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 29 Jan 86 p 3

[Article: "Greenland Can Negotiate Separately"]

[Text] Representatives of the Greenlandic home rule government can negotiate directly with authorities from other countries. This applies to cases in which special Greenlandic matters are involved, as long as the negotiations do not conflict with the interests of the entire nation.

This was indicated by Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (Liberal Party) in answer to a question from member of parliament Otto Steenholdt (Liberal Party), who represented Greenland. In order to uphold its own interests, Greenland can conduct international negotiations on fishing and the environment. In addition, Greenland can conduct ongoing consultations with Danish ministers and officials on issues that are under the authority of the home rule government and that are expected to be discussed at international forums. On the topic of jurisdiction over foreign policy matters, the foreign minister stressed in his answer that, according to the constitution, the entire Danish nation is a single entity and that the national authorities are responsible for relations with other countries.

9336

cso: 3613/59

POLITICAL

KOIVISTO, SORSA DEFEND MINISTER AGAINST ANTI-SOVIET CHARGE

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 8 Jan 86 p 10

[Text] On Tuesday Foreign Trade Minister Jermu Laine (Social Democrat) popped up as the commotion causing politician of the day when newspaper reports maintained that Laine would soon resign from the government because, among other reasons, the Soviets had criticized his statements on the Mastern trade and the Stalinist Communists attacked him in Parliament for making the same statements, giving him to understand that Laine can no longer handle Mastern trade affairs.

The rumor mill surrounding Laine led to his becoming the government's strongest minister in the space of 1 day. Laine received public support from both President Mauno Koivisto and Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa.

The Tuesday edition of HUFVUDSTADSBLADET published a news item on Laine's intentions of resigning and his plans to transfer to some government post. The fact that Laine's interview on the Eastern trade in the fall has been criticized in high-level Soviet quarters and that Laine is not on good terms with Koivisto were mentioned as reasons for this among others.

The discussion over Laine was continued later in Parliament when the Stalinists attacked him because of the same interview. According to Member of Parliament Asko-Juhani Tennila's charges, Laine issued disquieting statements on the Eastern trade and he has not demonstrated sufficient activity in the face of new challenges in the Soviet trade.

"You urge firms to turn to the West and you warn them against overly committing themselves to the Soviet Union. Such statements alone are an obstacle to your activity on behalf of the Eastern trade." Tennila said.

The statements by Laine alluded to by Tennila were published in the fall in the Neste [state oil company, information bulletin. In that interview Laine warned Finnish firms against one-sided exports to the Soviet Union. If an unexpected recession should occur in the Eastern trade, it is obvious that those firms that depend heavily on trade with the Soviet Union will easily be driven into a crisis."

In the interview Laine among other things remarked that a skilful business manager always regards Western markets as the chief market area. "The ability of firms' products to compete must be measured in terms of Western markets."

The Stalinist Communist organ, TTEDONANTAJA, attacked Laine as early as in the fall because of that interview. Among other things, it interpreted Laine as setting limits on the Eastern trade when he said that the Eastern trade is viewed "quite rightly as a part of our total foreign trade — in volume less than a fifth of the country's total exports."

Koivisto Issues a Communique

Aside from the Stalinist Communists, some Soviets have been said to have criticized Laine's interview, but official level comments on it have at least not reached foreign policy leaders. Several Social Democrats also commented just before Christmas that, since Laine speaks a bit too verbosely, his statements can be misinterpreted.

MUFVUDSTADSBLADET having written about the Soviet criticism and the rumors of Laine's resignation, the Swedish newspapers also tackled the matter. The afternoon paper, AFTONBLADET, carried headlines proclaiming that the Soviet Union is kicking out a Finnish minister.

When President Koivisto was informed of what was written in the Swedish newspapers, he issued a brief communique to the news media in which he denied, while the matter was still of current interest, the rumors that Laine had fallen into disfavor with the president.

Koivisto's communique reads as follows:

"According to rumors that have appeared in the press and which have already spread abroad, Minister Jermu Laine has, among other things, fallen into disfavor with me, as a result of which he is considering resigning from the government.

"Whatever plans Minister Laine may have, I hope that he will continue his meritorious work in the government in the knowledge that he has had and has my support.

"So I now hereby refute any claims of Finlandization!

"Mauno Koivisto."

Laine Has Found a Suitable Post

The president's swift reaction was explained in this way on Tuesday: Unless the rumors of Laine's resignation because of Soviet interference were quickly refuted, in the West there would again begin to be talk of Finlandization. If the discussion about Laine's position were to become agitated, the minister's position could become untenable.

Rumors of Laine's departure from the government have been circulating for a long time, especially just before Christmas when it was learned that Social Democrat leaders had become familiar with Laine's Eastern trade interview. The basic reason for Laine's contemplated resignation is, however, felt to be the fact that he no longer thinks that he will get into Parliament in the next elections.

Laine has indeed found himself a suitable government post. He was once offered the post of governor of Kymi, but it was not good enough for him. Laine himself was interested in the post of governor of Turku and Pori, but he did not get it. It has among other things recently been rumored that [he might get] the post of director of the Customs Administration, but it is at least not yet vacant.

On Tuesday Laine himself said that this was not quite the right time for switching government posts. According to the general appraisal, it would be very hard for Laine to leave the government without that being interpreted as the Soviets' having interfered in the matter.

On Tuesday Prime minister Sorsa announced that Laine enjoys the confidence of both the prime minister and the president and that he is highly regarded in both the East and the West.

### "Stalinist Campaign"

Social Democratic politicians have called the spreading of rumors of Laine's resignation a Stalinist Communist campaign. Laine himself is of the opinion that the Stalinist attack is connected with the domestic policy situation and the Communists' internal situation.

The rumors of his departure have, however, also received impetus among the Social Democrats themselves. Aside from the fact that it is known that Laine is seeking a post, we already know who may succeed him as minister. Party secretary Erkki Liikanen (Social Democrat) is expected to be promoted to minister as soon as a suitable occasion arises. He has not been aiming for the post of education minister that is to become vacant.

#### Laine Defended Himself

Laine sparingly issued statements on Tuesday with regard to the rumors of his resignation, but he defended himself against Tennila's attack in a session of Parliament.

In Laine's opinion, Tennila used his entire speech to belittle present-day gains in the Soviet trade.

"In my opinion, it is preposterous for this trade to be criticized in this chamber when its volume is the highest volume we have attained to date," Laine said.

Laine stated that the Soviet trade accounts for about 20 percent [of Finnish trade]. "I remember that, when I was minister of foreign trade for the first time in 1973, the situation was such that it accounted for from 12 to 13 percent," Laine said.

He also noted that this trade has never been at such a high level in terms of economic value.

Laine deplored the fact that in his speech Tennila had no new proposal for the development of the Soviet trade.

11,466 CSU: 3617/56 POLITICAL FINLAND

LATEST POLL SHOWS DROP IN SUPPORT FOR LEFT

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 8 Jan 86 p 10

[Text] According to an opinion poll conducted by the Finnish Gallup Company in November-December, support for the Finnish Rural Party (MP) has dropped by nearly half since the 1983 parliamentary elections. The Social Democrats and Communists have also lost their support. The Center Party (KEPU), the Conservative Party and the Greens have, on the other hand, gotten stronger.

During the period between 14 November and 10 December, the Finnish Gallup Company interviewed 1,896 people and, in connection with this, those interviewed were also asked which party they favored. A fourth of those interviewed did not express their party preference. The interviews were conducted in 73 municipalities, 34 of which were cities.

On the basis of the interviews, the Finnish Gallup Company estimated support for the parties to be as follows, with the results of the 1983 parliamentary elections in parentheses: SDP [Social Democratic Party], 25.6 (26.7); Conservative Party, 23.9 (22.1); KEPU-LKP, [Liberal Party], 19.7 (17.6); SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League], 11.7 (13.4); SMP, 5.5 (9.7); RKP [Swedish People's Party], 5.4 (4.6); Greens, 4.3 (1.5); SKL [Finnish Christian League], 3.3 (3.3); and POP [Constitutional Conservative Party], 0.6 (0.4). (STT [Finnish News Bureau]).

11,466 CSO: 3617/56 POLITICAL FINLAND

NEW AID BILL FOR 1986-1988 INCLUDES FUNDS FOR VIETNAM, EGYPT

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 21 Dec 85 p 15

[Article: "Of the 17 Highly Industrialized Countries, Finland Is the Second Lowest Provider of Funds; We Do Not Want to Commit Ourselves to a Development Aid Objective"]

[Text] Finland has a real chance of attaining the oft-postponed gross national product of 0.7 percent by 1989. We are not, however, definitively tied to that figure.

This is what Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen, who on Friday investigated mutual aid for development for 1986-1988 with the heads of the Foreign Ministry's Aid for Development Department, says.

The "Annual Report on Aid for Development" for last year, however, tells us that of the world's 17 highly industrialized countries Finland is the second lowest provider of funds for development aid and has the sixth lowest GNP.

Parliament will get to discuss this report next February.

#### No Certainty

Foreign Minister Vayrynen did not promise with any certainty that we would achieve the goal of a 0.7-percent GNP; rather he said that the end result would depend on the next government's aid for development policy, among other things. The Finance Ministry did not want to commit itself for that far into the future either.

Finland's aid for development program will continue in the second half of the 1980's along its basic lines in the same way it has during the preceding 3-year period. The biggest share (about 30 percent) will be directed to the least developed countries and foremost among them aid will be concentrated on those countries that have been objects of same up to now.

#### Big Projects

The so-called countries programmed for development aid will continue to be Egypt, Kenya, Zambia, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Vietnam.

According to Vayrynen, the new focal point is the fact that in future they intend to develop aid in the afore-mentioned countries in fewer projects than now, but which are more extensive in size, in those fields of activity for which it is generally agreed that the best expertise is to be found in Finland.

Pure gift aid will continue to be retained, chiefly in the form of assistance. Loans will continue to account for roughly what they do now, well under 10 percent.

Peace Corps

Vayrynen hopes that Parliament will properly familiarize itself with the 1984 report and go into both the objectives of aid for development and what has already been covered in thorough discussion in depth.

As a helping hand, in its aid limit decision the Foreign Ministry promised those civic organizations desirous of new activity to set in motion a so-called national peace corps operation as soon as next year. The operation will offer more young volunteers than before a chance to get into the practical aid for development field to work at the grass roots level.

Tanzania in the Lead

According to the limit decision, Egypt will be assigned 60 million markkas in aid next year and 70 million markkas the following 2 years. Zambia's share will be 75 million markkas next year, the same amount also in 1987 and 80 million markkas in 1988.

Next year Kenya will receive 60 million in aid, 70 million markkas the following year and 75 million markkas in 1988. Next year Sri Lanka's aid limit will be 45 million and 60 million markkas in each of the following 2 years.

Tanzania, which will next year be assigned 125 million markkas, retains the status of overwhelmingly largest aid recipient. In accordance with this, in 1987 Tanzania will receive 130 million markkas and 135 million in 1988. Vietnam's limit will be 45 million markkas for next year and 50 million each for the following year and the one after that.

11,466 CSO: 3617/53 POLITICAL FINLAND

POLL VIEWS PREFERENCES FOR COALITION BASES, PRIME MINISTER

Center-Left Coalition Firmly Supported

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 22 Dec 85 pp 16,17

[Article by Timo Pirttinen]

In Finland it does not pay to be very concerned for the Center-Left coalition any more than it does for consensus. A clear majority of the nation supports the present government coalition and recommends that it remain in power after the next elections as well, the opinion poll commissioned by UUSI SUOMI reveals. Kalevi Sorsa is the most popular candidate for prime minister.

However, drawing the Conservative Party into the government is also a highly favored notion — as many as 42 percent of the Social Democrats back it. On the other hand, a purely nonsocialist government does not receive any real support even in the Conservative Party.

However, in the eyes of the people the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] is labeled as being a long-term opposition party. Only its own supporters recommend that it be part of the government. On the other hand, not even in the SKDL do they believe in a purely leftist government.

There has recently been lively discussion of the government coalition and there is no more time than a little over a year until the March 1987 parliamentary elections. Center Party chairman Paavo Vayrynen and party secretary Seppo Kaariainen have made a very emotional appeal to preserve the Center-Left government — at the time of the elections it will be exactly 50 years old.

Kaariainen has also warned Social Democrats not to gamble on the Conservative Party card. Kalevi Sorsa and Ilkka Suominen have had talks and a few public winks between Siltasaari and Kansakoulukuja have been observed. Suominen's disparaging appraisal of the chances of a nonserialist government should also be noted. On the other hand, he has stressed e fact that changes are likely to be slow.

Under these circumstances, UUSI SUOMI had Taloustutkimus [Economic Research Company] poll citizens' views of the government coalition. Taloustutkimus interviewed 974 Finns from the ages of 15 to 69 in 91 towns between 15 and 27

November 1985. The materials were weighted in a manner similar to that used in Finland's official statistics. The results are statistically reliable, generally within a margin of a couple of percentage points.

The form in which questions are posed always influences the answers and little internal contradictions may be found among the results of these as well. The overall picture is, nevertheless, very clear: A considerable degree of satisfaction with the current situation prevails in consensus—dominated Finland and pressures for, for example, a radical change in the government coalition are not great. However, people would like to extend the consensus coalition to include the Conservative Party.

They Are Most Satisfied in the SDP

The question as to whether the present government coalition is the best possible one is a general one in nature, but also a very demanding one with its superlative. The result did turn out to be a fairly even 56 to 36. The internal distribution of the answers is, however, interesting.

The greatest dissatisfaction with it was in the Conservative Party. A scant majority in another opposition party, the SKDL, was also negative toward the present government model. Clearly most satisfied with it were the Social Democrats, while in the SMP [Finnish Rural Party] there appeared to be two kinds of attitudes.

The Greens are not in the government, but nevertheless reacted more favorably to it than the nonsocialist government parties. Since there were 53 (6 percent) Greens voters in the sample, we must be a bit cautious in our conclusions with respect to them, as well as the SMP and even the SKDL (64 respondents, or 7 percent), especially in questions containing many alternatives.

#### Stronger Conservatives

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Middle-aged and older people are clearly more satisfied with the present government coalition than those under 30. To be sure, 51 percent of them view the present government coalition as the best possibility (60 percent of those over 60). Satisfaction and a certain conservatism, preserving the status quo, apparently increase with age.

In this as in other questions, the respondent's social status and party preference were reflected in the answers in the expected parallel fashion. Managers and in part office workers associated themselves with the Conservatives, farmers with the Centrists and workers with answers [favoring] parties of the Left. So those most dissatisfied with the government coalition were the managers.

## Wouldn't the Conservative Party Stir Things Up?

Every second Finn supported getting the Conservative Party to join the government. This may seem to be in contradiction with the appliance given the present government coalition and the hopes for its preservation after the next elections.

Obviously, people do not view bringing the Conservative Party into the present government as a very radical change, rather as a natural addition to the present government. In terms of platforms, for example, in economic policy, the actual differences have after all become very small.

Of course, its supporters most fervently hope that the Conservative Party will join the government; four out of five supported the idea. However, over half of the Centrists and Liberals also wanted the Conservative Party as a partner in the government.

Most significant is, nevertheless, the fact that 42 percent of the Social Democrats also wanted the Conservative Party in the government. Since its own supporters were very unfavorably disposed to the idea of the SDP's being left in the opposition, the conclusion is that the Social Democrats would like to have the Conservative Party alongside them in the government.

SDP Is Alienating Itself from the Center Party

The substantial popularity of the Conservative Party in the SDP may be connected with the fact too that 12 percent of the Social Democrats would like to get the Center Party out of the government. Would they like to get rid of the Center Party, which is raising its profile with its regional policy, and have in its stead the Conservative Party, which better understands the affairs of industrial Finland and business and industry in the cities?

Interestingly enough, as many as almost one out of every five SKDL voters would like to have the Conservative Party in the government. The fact that the popularity of the idea is no greater than this among the Greens confirms the impression that the Greens feel that they are far from the speed of the conservative Party and are particularly close to the Social Democrats.

In terms of age groups, a Conservative Party assumption of responsibility in the government is most favored in the mature groups, the youngest being among those in their thirties, the radical generation of the early 1970's. The popularity of a Conservative Party assumption of responsibility in the government is, however, now again rising in the youngest age group.

Although only a scant majority in the Center Party supports bringing the Conservative Party into the government, of the different social groups the idea is most favored among farmers — even more strongly so than among managers. Are Center Party supporters other than farmers close to the SMP, only one out of three of whose voters wants the Conservative Party in the government?

They Want to Keep the SKDL in the Opposition

Only a decade ago they were advocating that the SKDL be part of the government. Now the party has been labeled an opposition party. Only one out of eight Finns hopes that the extreme Left will return to the Council of State.

And this one out of eight consists mostly of the SKDL's own voters. Even in the SDP only one out of five supports the idea, in the other parties hardly anyone.

Women Want Everyone in the Government

Particularly men favor bringing the Conservative Party as well as, especially, the SKDL into the government; only 5 percent of the women would like to have the extreme Left on the Council of State. Behind this in part is the fact that women somewhat more than men do not support any change whatsoever in the government coalition.

On the other hand, women more than men (14 to 10) support a government of all the parties; could this be a sign of a desire for some sort of harmony? The same is indicated by the fact that a government of all the parties was more favored in small towns than the big cities; especially in small communities the local administration is a coaliton of all the parties.

The fact too that of all the age groups those over 60 most favor a government of all the parties points to the goal of harmony. Of the different parties, a government of all the parties enjoys the greatest support in the SDP. In the opinion of the Social Democrats, could we in this way get the Conservative Party into the government without running into problems with the Communists, for example, in the labor-union movement?

Support for other proposals to change the government coalition was very slight. There is a little symptomatic importance in the distribution in the fact that young people in particular (10 percent) want to get the SDP out of the government. Are the SDP's own young people becoming more radical or do young people perceive the government caretaker party as being foreign to themselves?

Very much expected, on the other hand, was the fact that people are alienating themselves from the SMP's role in the government, especially in the big cities and among managers. The idea of getting rid of Pekka Vennamo and Urpo Leppanen did not, however, receive very strong support anywhere.

### Complicated Fundamental Problem

The question as to whether a nonsocialist or socialist majority in Parliament should reflect the composition of the government is not a very simple one to answer. This has been advocated especially by the Center Party, which also served in the government before after a fashion "on behalf of" the Conservative Party. Particularly the SDP has, on the other hand, emphasized "normal parliamentarianism," that is, that only the number of representatives of each of the government parties should reflect the composition of the government.

In the poll the answers to this question turned out to be fairly evenly divided. The Conservatives, however, emphasized more than the others a basic distribution in Parliament — that is, in practice the nonsocialist status of the government — while the People's Democrats, on the other hand, did so clearly less than the others.

Present Coalition Was Solidly in the Lead

The basis of a future government coalition was, on the other hand, a clearer question. The present coalition enjoys broad support — even in the Conservative Party a scant majority, 52 percent, supported it. SKDL support for the Center-Left coalition was even greater — 57 percent. All the current government parties down to and including the SMP were satisfied with the coalition, likewise — perhaps surprisingly so — the Greens.

Of the different age groups, support for the present coalition was greatest in the former radical generation of those in their thirties — for what reason? Those most dissatisfied with it, on the other hand, were those over 60, who did not really support any other alternative either, but replied more often than the others: "I cannot say" (24 percent). Alienation and/or bitterness over pensions and the treatment of war veterans, for example?

Is a Nonsocialist Government Unrealistic?

So a nonsocialist government is not a popular idea -- even in the Conservative Party only 35 percent supported it, less than for the present government coalition. Moreover, the poll was conducted before Ilkka Suominen declared that a nonsocialist government was a very unrealistic idea.

A bit more solid than the average, support for a nonsocialist government was entirely in the youngest and oldest age groups. The former are unbiased while the latter perhaps remember that a nonsocialist government can be effective (and not inevitably lead to labor conflicts, for example, either)?

There was significant support for a purely leftist government only in the SKDL; there, only one out of three dreamed of it. On the other hand, the Social Democrats were not captivated with the idea. Of the different age groups, the popularity of the idea was greatest in the radical generation of those in their thirties.

## [Poll Results]

In Finland for many years the government has been formed on the basis of the Left and the Center. The present government too is chiefly composed of Social Democrats and the Center Party. In your opinion, is the present government coalition the best possible one?

	A11	In the	e nex	t parli	amenta	ry el	ections	
Response	<u>%</u>	would SKDL		for: KESK*	KOK*	SMP	Greens	Others
Yes	56	40	77	65	25	56	68	52
No	36	52	15	29	72	42	30	40

How might this government coalition be improved?

	<u>A11</u>	SKDL	SDP	KESK	KOK	SMP	Greens	Others
With the Conservative Party								
in the government	49	18	42	56	80	32	19	38
With the SKDL in the govern-								
ment	12	70	21	6	2	4	6	5
With the SDP out of the								
government	6	6	9	4	8	9	6	10
With the Center Party out of								
the government	5	9	12	0	3	0	6	2.4
With the SMP out of the								
government	9	9	12	10	7	5	6	19
With all parties participating	12	8	17	1.2	10	9	0	13
In other ways (respondents' own	า							
suggestions, for example)								
- through change of leaders	5	6	4	4	2	19	7	1 1
- by diminishing the power of								
the Left	1	0	0	6	()	()	()	()
- in other ways	5	9	4	4	3	5	6	21
Cannot say	19	9	20	17	2	40	5()	4

Should the government correspond to the parliamentary majority and be based on either a nonsocialist or a socialist coalition in accordance with each one's majority in Parliament?

	A11	SKDL	SDP	KESK	KOK	SMP	Greens	Others
Should be so based	50	42	49	53	62	54	43	49
Need not be so based	39	51	42	38	37	39	49	48

If the balance of power among the parties does not essentially change from what it is now in the 1987 parliamentary elections, should the government...

	<u> A11</u>	SKDL	SDP	KESK	KOK	SMP	Greens	Others
be formed on the present								
basis	69	57	81	80	52	72	76	69
solely on a nonsocialist								
basis	11	0	1	11	35	8	7	14
solely on a leftist basis	5	32	6	0	0	6	6	2.
Cannot say	16	11	12	9	13	15	11	16

I would like the following person to form the next government and be prime minister:

	<u>A11</u>	SKDL	SDP	KESK	кок	SMP	Greens	0thers
Kalevi Sorsa	40	45	75	30	32	33	39	41
Paavo Vayrynen	17	14	3	47	13	10	16	9
Ilkka Suominen	9	0	1	3	36	12	8	12
Someone else, for example:								
- Kalevi Kivisto	1	2	1	0	0	17	0	2
- Ahti Pekkala	1	0	0	1	0	0	4	2
- Christoffer Taxell	1	0	0	O	1	0	2	6
- Pekka Vennamo	1	0	0	0	4	0	0	2
- Raimc Ilaskivi	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0
- Someone else**	6	8	7	3	7	11	15	10
- don't care which person	1	1	1	0	0	0	4	0
Cannot say	22	20	13	16	16	19	13	15

- \* KESK [Center Party], KOK [Conservative Party]
- \*\* This figure does not yet include the support given Harri Holkeri and Johannes Virolainen, which has not even, however, exceeded 1 percent in any party.

Sorsa Top Candidate for Prime Minister

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 22 Dec 85 p 17

[Article by Jyrki Vesikansa]

[Text] Kalevi Sorsa is the overwhelming favorite to head the government too after the next elections. One out of five Conservatives and 40 percent of all citizens support him.

The clearcut runner-up was Center Party chairman Paavo Vayrynen. He has the strong support of his own people, but he was clearly overshadowed by Sorsa in the second nonsocialist party, the Conservative Party.

Offered as the third alternative on the questionnaire, Ilkka Suominen enjoyed very strong support in his own party, the Conservative Party, and, surprisingly, some sort of sympathy in the SMP too. Among the other parties, however, support for him was slight.

No other alternatives were specifically listed on the questionnaire; rather the respondents had to "invent" them themselves. No one received any significant support through this form of questioning. The spontaneous mentioning of Ahti Pekkala may, however, be of some symptomatic significance.

Men and Women and a Man's Man

Sorsa's popularity was, of course, greatest in his own party, the SDP, but it was also particularly strong among SKDL voters. Support for the prime minister in the Center Party or the Conservative Party could not be regarded as being very weak either.

Women clearly supported Sorsa more strongly than did men -- as for Vayrynen, the alignment was just the opposite. As for Suominen, he was a "woman's man" like Sorsa.

Support for Sorsa has not changed very much in the different age groups. Those over 60 gave him the least support -- might this be in connection with farmers' dissatisfaction with Sorsa or memories of Valco?

Those in managerial positions supported Sorsa less than the average —— but more enthusiastically than the average Conservative of farmer. That is, the moderate nature of Sorsa's economic policy since the early 1970's has certainly been noticed.

Home Turf Assured

Therefore, support for Paavo Vayrynen came particularly strongly from his own ranks. He has clearly striven to first assure his position on his home turf. This, of course, means giving prominence to the small communities in his constituency.

Deviating from the usual age distribution in the Center Party, Vayrynen's popularity was, however, greatest in his own age group or in the group that is slightly younger than he, that is, those in their thirties.

Vayrynen's problem is, on the other hand, the nearly nonexistent support for him in the big cities (6 percent compared to, for example, Suominen's 13 percent). The Social Democrats take no note of him, the People's Democrats, however, much more so. The 13-percent support figure obtained among the Conservatives is also very low when what is at issue is the most likely alternative to a leftist prime minister.

Sorsa the Most Favored One in Northern Finland Too

Interestingly enough, managers and office workers too supported Vayrynen a bit more than did the Conservatives on the average. Regionally, support for Vayrynen was, or course, greatest in northern Finland, but not even there did it rise to over 23 percent (that is, there too he obtained primarily the support of his own people; support for Sorsa beat Vayrynen in Northern Finland too with 33 percent).

Support for Ilkka Suominen was also built on the, to be sure, rather firm support of his own people. Other Conservatives (Raimo Ilaskivi, Harri Holkeri, etc.) were not mentioned in the questionnaire. However, the difference between Suominen and them was very great.

As it was for Vayrynen, support for Suominen was a bit stronger than average in his own age group, those in their forties. Regionally, the strongest districts were, perhaps a bit surprisingly, Kymenlaani and Savo; Suominen is from Satakunta and Helsinki.

11,466 CSO: 3617/53 POLITICAL

PAPANDREOU'S 1986 OPTIONS: PRESIDENCY OR ELECTIONS

Athens I VRADYNI TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 29 Dec 85 p 3

[Text] Premier A.Papandreou finds himself in a tragic dilemma having to face an uncertain future. He knows very well that in the event his government topples--because of the economic disater to which he is leading the country--it will be impossible for him to retain PASOK's leadership and whatever happens, he will leave politics (and the country?) because his temperament will not permit him to remain without power again.

According to political observers, the developments in the area of the economy will become evident—even for those who willingly do not wish to see it—during the first 3 months of 1986 and the counting in the opposite direction will begin. This Mr. Papandreou himself knows perhaps better than anyone else and for this reason also knows that he will be going through a critical 3-month period during which he will be forced to make definite decisions and to plan the methods he will follow. However, whatever is decided, must be done before the municipal elections that will take place next October. Unless the premier believes that he can hold on to a relative strength (more than 40 percent) in October's electoral contest, then his scheming will be turned in that direction.

Political observers maintain that PASOK will suffer a telling drop in the municipal elections regardless of any government machinations because cheating at the polls is not easily done nor can any preelectoral hiring influence the results. It is also certain that the discord that presently exists between the electorate and parliament will be registered in October and then it will be impossible for the government to remain in power.

Thus, under the best of circumstances—as long as the government does not fall before that (a fact that does not appear likely before summer)—the country will have to hold general parliamentary elections prior to the end of 1986. In this case, it is certain that PASOK (and Mr. Papandreou as long as he continues to be in the Movement's leadership) will definitely lose the power to govern.

#### Presidential Aims

Mr. Papandreou is very much aware of the forecasts and for this reason he is today faced with a dramatic dilemma as to whether he must scheme in order to

go over to the presidency of the republic where he has always cast his eye. It is not by accident that the subject was brought up by the pro-government press (especially by the one that acts under orders) in order to mold public opinion.

However, for such an operation the premier has to face three factors:

- 1. Mr. Sartzetakis. The present president does not appear to be disposed to resigning his position even if he is asked by the one who offered it to him. Up until now, Mr. Sartzetakis has shown that he is totally fascinated by the role of president of the republic and believes that it belongs to him by right. After all, it is for this that he was elected, as he himself claims. The matter of Mr. Sartzetakis' resignation is going to be assigned to Mr. Menios Koutsogiorgas who is very close to him.
- 2. PASOK. The probability of a move by Mr. A. Papandreou over to the presidency of the republic attracts the party leaders, who feel that "their hour has come." However, even that is not certain because the factions that are fighting for succession do not appear to be ready for the final confrontation. At the same time, though, there are the non-Marxist centrists (there exists such a species) who fearfully face the prospect of Mr. A. Papandreou's leaving the movement's leadership. According to reports from the premier's close circle, Mr. A. Papandreou has found the ideal solution through which he will postpone the confrontation of the factions and will calm the middle-of-the-roaders. This would be the pushing of the present president of the Chamber of Deputies, Giannis Alevras into the premiership. With this machination, Mr. Papandreou would succeed in having a man who could not oppose him (as was shown with the colored ballots) in the leadership of the government.

At the same time, however, it calms down the moderates, while the party men know that it is a matter of a totally temporary solution that can be upset prior to the next electoral contest.

3. The small parties. The premier needs the vote of the KKE, of the independents and perhaps a number of DIANA deputies in order to put together the 180 votes he needs. In order to achieve this, he is sure to offer the simple proportional system in exchange. In this case, Messrs. Kyrkos, Glezos, Mavros and Zigdis will have no objections, while it is not certain that Stathis Panagoulis will be of the same mind, his stand will depend on the situation in general. The DIANA deputies will have a positive attitude (with the exception of Mr. K. Stefanopoulos, who, as a matter of "principle," will not accept voting for Mr. Papandreou) because only by the simple proportional system do they have any hope for survival as a party, while otherwise (reinforced system) they know that they will disappear.

What Will the KKE Do?

The determining factor, however, will be the position of the KKE. The party can support the simple proportional system because with it it will increase significantly its parliamentary representation, but it is uncertain that it will accept Mr. A. Papandreou as president of the republic. Many KKE cadres openly express their fears about the totalitarian temperament of the present premier,

but they will follow the "line" they will get from the North. As of today, no one knows what it will be yet.

What can surely be foreseen is that the premier's New Year's message for the "1987 new year" will not be signed by A. Papandreou.

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CSO: 3821/79

POLITICAL

PAPANDREOU'S ANTI-KARAMANLIS MOVE SEEN USELESS

Athens KIRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTIPIA in Greek 29 Dec 85 p 9

[Text] Two significant events marked the political developments of 1985 and will decidedly influence the political prospects of the new year: K. Karamanlis' removal from the presidency of the republic on 9 March and PASOK's abandoning the "3 September" proclamations after its second electoral victory on 2 June. They are two historical decisions by PASOK's leadership that marked the politics of 1985.

Today, when the old year is already becoming the past, a critical look at these decisive political moves by the leadership of PASOK is timely.

The move of 9 March to remove Karamanlis from the presidency of the republic was a free political choice by PASOK. The "post-June" deviation from the socialist proclamations was dictated by national and economic reality. The first move could have been avoided, the second was unavoidable. There is both a logical and political paradox in the two moves. They appear to be unconnected. They are not consistent and they are contradictory.

The removal of Karamanlis was interpreted and hailed as a break by the Left with the conservative establishment, as a clearing of the last obstacle in the way of socialist change. But after 2 June the socialist way was abandoned and PASOK's leadership turned the government's policy towards the conservative direction of Karamanlis and tacitly accepted and practiced the "cursed" doctrine of Karamanlis: "We belong to the West."

The removal of Karamanlis would have been understandable and politically justified had the leadership of PASOK continued on and implemented the course set during the first 4 years by the administration. This, however, was not done and the leadership knew on 9 March of the conservative turn that it would be forced to make after the elections of 2 June. Thus, the PASOK government lost even the broadest consent for its new policy, which would have helped in any case or rather would have been assured by Karamanlis' presence as president of the republic. Here is the logical and political paradox.

It is as if the two political moves had been made by two different political currents. There is something of a vacuum and some inconsistency in the reasoning and in the policy of PASOK's leadership on 9 March and in its post-electoral turn.

Any attempt by a third party to explain this "intellectual vacuum" would be hazardous. Perhaps the leadership of PASOK is even now questioning itself about this contradiction in its political moves. Moreover, it is perhaps difficult in this country for two strong personalities to coexist in two centers of power, whether they agree or disagree in their overall policy.

There exist historical precedents of the then all-powerful palace with the strong personalities of premiers Alex. Papagos, K. Karamanlis and Georgios Papandreou. However, this explanation enters into the realm of psychology. Someday we will learn the real political explanation.

The removal of Karamanlis from the presidency did not help the PASOK government's policy the way it was shaped after 2 June. This is now evident even to the leftist "day-dreamers" of PASOK. Even if Karamanlis had decided to make use of the superpowers of the president of the republic, there would not have been any reason to exercise them after the "post-June" turn of the government's policy on internal affairs and on relations with the Western Alliance. There would have been political rapprochement instead of distance.

Karamanlis' removal did not even help the PASOK government's foreign policy. As paradoxical as it may appear to those who believe that Karamanlis was the support of the Atlantic Alliance in Greece, the Americans are now trying to take advantage of his removal. The Americans appreciate the fact that with the removal of Karamanlis there was a schism in the countrys' national front, which, until 9 March, was being expressed in a sort of national agreement at the nation's summit. Today they rush to exploit the unbridgeable opposition of the PASOK and ND leaderships and they try to become themselves the power brokers for agreement in our national affairs and the exercise of our foreign policy.

It is significant that there was an increase in American activity in Greece after 9 March. The contacts of the Americans with government officials and with the ND leadership have increased. The pressure and blackmail on the government have increased and the Americans are trying to push their aims trough the cracks caused by the disagreements of the two big parties. The Americans not only plot with the government itself, they take care to "forewarn" it about the corresponding plots they foster simulatneously with the official opposition. They support the refusal of the official opposition to agree with the government's foreign policy and the government's need for this agreement in the maneuvers of foreign policy.

Karamanlis' presence in the presidency of the republic ensured national agreeent in the implementation of the present economic and foreign policy of the government. From this point of view there is no justification for the political move of 9 March by the leadership of PASOK. It only demolished the myth and the hopes of those who believed that without Karamanlis the institution of presidential democracy would collapse.

Now the Karamanlis affair belongs to the past, of course. Today, the problem is to restore the "national consensus," which was destroyed on 9 March, in order to effectively confront our national issues. The official opposition has a national duty to contribute to this with a sincere and open statement

to everyone that it stands by the government in the exercise of its foreign policy. There will be no breech in the national front and let neither friend nor foe hope for it. There is only one foreign policy, that of the government. This statement by the official opposition is necessary and can fill the "vacuum" left by Karamanlis that the Americans yearn to "fill."

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POLITICAL PORTUGAL

RETROSPECTIVE VIEW OF 1985 POLITICAL EVENTS

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 28 Dec 85 p 3

[Text] Cavaco Silva: Political Figure of the Year

Anibal Cavaco Silva was the political figure of 1985.

He was responsible for the decisions which most affected Portuguese political life in the second half of the year.

His ascent to the leadership of the PSD [Social Democratic Party] in May was the beginning of a process that completely changed the political scenarios that had been foreseeable when the year began.

It was Cavaco Silva who broke up the coalition, putting an end to the PS [Socialist Party]-PSD alliance, thus opening the way for the reconstruction of the Democratic Alliance—which has been the dream of the Right ever since the death of Sa Carneiro.

It was Cavaco Silva who fought hardest for the dismissal of the government and for new elections.

It was Cavaco Silva who won, practically single-handed, the battle of the ballot box on 6 October, making the PSD the major political force in Portugal.

It was also Cavaco Silva who, against the wishes of an important part of his party, led the PSD to support the presidential candidacy of Freitas do Amaral.

For all these reasons, Cavaco Silva deserves to be considered the political figure of the year--and no one else was even in the running for this distinction.

It should be noted, in this regard, that his path has been on a rising curve.

After his victory in the Congress of Figueira da Foz, he rapidly consolidated his position in the party, he conducted a good campaign, he won the legislative elections, he imposed an image as a government leader and he bettered the results of the PSD in the local elections.

He had the virtue of going from the opposition to the government without changing his style.

He has in his favor the fact that he does not belong to the political class and his mode of action is different from that which the country has become accustomed to in politicians and which the country is tired of.

He conveys an impression of effectiveness and, as prime minister, he does not air differences in the public square.

He has an important advantage over Soares: that of seeming to believe in what he says.

Unlike the former prime minister, who constantly gave the impression that he was not convinced of what he was saying and that he was speaking only to convince the Portuguese of something that he himself did not believe, Cavaco Silva apparently believes in what he says—and appears capable of putting his words into action.

Cavaco embodies the type (rare) of the "technocrat with faith."

Democratic Renewal Party

If Cavaco Silva was the political revelation of 1985, the Democratic Renewal Party [PRD] was the disillusionment.

Having obtained election results in October which exceeded the most optimistic forecasts and made the Democratic Renewal Party the third major Portuguese party, close behind the Socialist Party, the PRD did not live up to its success, and in 2 short months has wasted capital which had been accumulated over years.

The story of the falsification of signatures (even more serious in a party whose badge was "honesty"), the lack of internal coordination (patently clear in the contradictory statements of some of its most distinguished leaders) and the apparent "disharmony" with regard to General Eanes (which may have arisen from the Costa Braz incident) helped to erode the image of the party and contributed to the electoral disaster of 15 December.

It should be said, however, that the great political mistake of the PRD was its own participation in the local elections.

A party which wins 18 percent in some legislative elections and which admittedly does not have established and tested structures at the national level cannot afford to gamble away those results 2 months later.

In October, the PRD was successful beyond its dreams; in light of this, its strategy should have been to make the most of its laurels, not to expose itself or run any risks until it had consolidated its organization.

By competing in some elections for which it was manifestly unprepared, the PRD did precisely the opposite of what it should have done.

It behaved like a gambler who has hit a "jackpot" and, dazzled by his luck, squanders all his winnings in the hope of winning again.

Eanes Pays for PRD Fall

The problem is that the disillusionment which the PRD represented—after having been the great political novelty of the year—would end by reflecting on the prestige of General Eanes himself.

It is inarguable that the erosion of the image of the PRD was prejudicial to the image of the president of the republic--who, in all truth, has not done much to preserve that image in this final period of his mandate.

With the ineffectual support for Costa Braz, followed by the involvement in Salgado Zenha's candidacy (when everything would have counseled a cautious stance), Eanes ended by losing, in 1985, part of what he had been nursing since 1976.

A question occurs to us here. How much power will Ramalho Eanes have when he leaves Belem Palace if, after everything that has happened, the candidate he supports does not win the presidential elections?

The category of disillusionments of the year would not be complete if we did not mention the failed presidential candidacy of Gen Firmino Miguel.

Firmino Miguel came to be the virtual president of the republic--inasmuch as he could count on the votes of the PSD and the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] at the outset, along with the votes of many Eanists and even some sympathy in the APU [United People's alliance] electorate.

His victory was, therefore, practically certain.

If he had gone forward, Freitas do Amaral would not have come on the scene-nor, probably, would Salgado Zenha.

The refusal of the Army vice chief of staff was thus an important event, completely altering the final picture in which the presidential elections would take place.

Surprise: 6 October Elections

The 6 October elections, called by the president after Cavaco Silva broke up the coalition, were the great surprise of 1985.

They completely changed the political picture in which, with a few alterations, the country had been living since 1975, provoking a real revolution at the voting booth.

The general message of the electoral results was the rejection of the "known," indicating that the voters were very weary and somewhat disillusioned with the way the country was being managed.

The Socialist Party, which had held the majority in the previous government and which was seen as the "symbol of the system," was naturally penalized the most severely, losing 16 percent of its votes in relation to the last elections and about 12 percent of its traditional electorate.

The APU--and thus the Communist Party--dropped 3 percent.

The CDS also declined, notwithstanding the poor results it had already shown in 1983.

The only gainers were the "new party"--the PRD--and a "novelty" called Cavaco Silva, who put his own stamp on the image of the PSD, making the voters forget that it was also a part of the previous government.

It should be noted, however, that the picture of the country resulting from the 6 october elections could be a fleeting image.

The poor vote obtained by the PRD in the local elections, along with a certain recovery of the PS, could mean that this year's legislative elections were an exceptional event and will not be repeated.

In fact, it is possible that between the Socialist Party and the Democratic Renewal Party--which appear to function as communion vessels--there might well be new adjustments, with the rise of the Socialists and the decline of the Renewalists.

Less accidental, apparently, is the rise of the Social Democratic Party, which continues to be one of the more intriguing phenomena of Portuguese politics.

It is noted that the PSD, despite the period of agony it experienced after the death of Sa Carneiro, barely suffered any electoral decline.

Moreover, it survived, without falling apart, the spectacle of three successive changes in leadership, with Balsemao, Mota Pinto and Machete in turn failing to impose their authority.

Finally, the PSD showed it was capable of a sudden rebirth and soon achieved a new equilibrium, even becoming the major Portuguese party--a position which it would confirm in the local elections on 15 December.

The history of the PSD since 25 April, preserving a noteworthy electoral stability despite almost continuous internal instability, seems to prove that the Social Democratic party--perhaps more than the Socialist Party--corresponds to the deepest interests of the Portuguese society.

Presidential Elections: Backdrop

The year 1985 was one of the most fertile in terms of political events. From the death of Mota Pinto to the birth of the PRD, from the collapse of the central bloc to the formation of the first government of the PSD alone, from the surprising results of 6 October to the appearance of the "Cavaco phenomenon"

and a new leader for the CDS, the year's developments were really influenced by an event which would not take place until next year: the presidential elections.

The elections constituted the real backdrop of 1985--a backdrop which frequently won front-stage prominence.

In addition to the two presidential candidacies which were already in existence (those of Mario Soares and Lourdes Pintasilgo), two others appeared this year-those of Freitas do Amaral and Salgado Zenha--and another two which presented strong possibilities of success died before they were born--those of Firmino Miguel and Costa Braz (both military officers, we note).

Of the four candidates who are within the party framework, two appear to have the better chance of victory: Freitas do Amaral and Lourdes Pintasilgo.

The former (who only emerged after the withdrawal of Firmino Miguel) benefited from Cavaco Silva's unexpected rise to the leadership of the PSD--thus ensuring the support of the Social Democrats for Firmino's candidacy, making him the only candidate on the Right and assuring him of 40 percent of the votes and a secure passage to the second round.

Eng Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo has shown herself to be a real "force of nature," achieving what appeared to be the impossible: to create the conditions for victory although she did not have the support of any of the four major parties.

Regarding the other two candidates, Mario Soares appears to be in the better position, although he presents the curious characteristic-contrary to what would be been expected a year ago--of pinning most of his hopes on the electorate of the Right.

It is, in fact, the Right to which Soares is openly turning today--aware that the Left will be divided between Zenha and Pintasilgo.

Mario Soares is seeking to represent himself to the conservative voter as an experienced and skilled man who, in addition to impeding the communists' access to power, could ensure the stability and operationality of the nation's institutions, even if he should run into a difficult situation, as happened in 1975.

The difference between Soares and Freitas do Amaral is that, while Freitas is promising the Right that the situation "will improve" with him, because there will be harmony between the president and the government, Soares guarantees that, with him as president, things will at least "not get worse," come what may.

We shall see how these two propositions are viewed by the part of the electorate which desires political stability, above all else.

Zenha or Pintasilgo

Salgado Zenha, who was launched late in the game and has conducted a pale campaign, does not appear at this time to have much chance of overtaking Soares

and Lourdes Pintasilgo and making it to the second round. The poor results obtained by the PRD in the local elections are not in his favor, either.

The difference between Zenha and Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo is that, whereas the engineer rose from the bottom to the top, based on a clumsy organization and relying, above all, on herself, Salgado Zenha started out with the almost certain endorsement of the PRD and the PCP.

It remains to be seen to what extent those who voted for the PRD in the legislative elections and the APU electorate will heed the endorsement of those parties.

The basic question will be: What is the "expedient vote on the Left"? Is it for Salgado Zenha or Lourdes Pintasilgo?

Which of the two is in a better position to defeat Freitas and Soares?

For now, the candidate in the better position appears to be Eng Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo--and for this reason it is quite likely that voters who are still undecided on the Left will incline toward Pintasilgo.

It is clear that the siuation could change between now and 26 January. For Zenha, the problem is that time is beginning to run out.

6362

CSO: 3542/61

MILITARY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

DANISH AUTHOR REVEALS NORDIC MISSION OF SPETSNAZ FORCE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 12 Jan 86 p 11

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard]

[Text] Spetsnaz soldiers are equipped with a rough file to be used as an instrument of torture. It can be used to file down the teeth of prisoners until this painful torture forces them to tell all they know.

It is also said that they use live prisoners who have been sentenced to death instead of sandbags to practice fighting with bayonets, so that killing humans becomes a matter of routine.

These are only a few of the revelations about the Spetsial'noe naznachenie—the Special Forces that are commonly known as Spetsnaz—that Jens Thomsen of BERLINGSKE TIDENDE describes in his new book on the KGB. This information was revealed to Western military intelligence agencies after a high-ranking diplomat and KGB member defected to England in 1979. This man, who goes by the pseudonym Viktor Suvorov, is the "Man without a Face" in the Swedish—Danish television program, to be shown today at 2230, on the gruesome preparations for war by the Soviet intelligence agency.

The Spetsnaz forces, which total about 30,000 men, are now seeing daily action in Afghanistan, where their specialized training is being used in the massacre of Afghan partisans, according to the prestigious military journal MILITARY TECHNOLOGY.

In the eyes of Danes, however, their operations in the Baltic Sea area may be of the greatest interest. The northern military district of the Soviet Union includes at least one division of Spetsnaz forces. They are specially trained to be used in Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish regions. Most of these soldiers speak the language of the country to which they are to be sent even before war breaks out. They know these areas well from many previous visits as elite sportsmen. It is typical of Spetsnaz that it recruits its people from the large sports and soccer clubs. As a result, every time Soviet sportsmen are invited it must be seen as a threat to our own security.

Suvorov revealed that Spetsnaz soldiers in the Baltic region speak fluent Swedish or Finnish and that the purpose of the submarines that are observed from time to time in the Swedish archipelago is to spy on Sweden and to practice landing special forces that, in cooperation with local communist collaborators, are to murder persons in key positions and to sabotage both military facilities and important social functions, preferably before war breaks out.

So far, Denmark has not been described in detail in connection with the Spetsnaz revelations. This may be a coincidence, but it may also be because other Warsaw Pact forces are earmarked for use against Denmark. It is known in this connection, for example, that Polish and East German units learn Danish and are in possession of Danish military uniforms. These forces would be used to infiltrate Danish territory in a crisis or during a war. Actual infiltration such as the infiltration that is believed to have occurred in Sweden is not known to have taken place in Denmark, although several years ago a Soviet gas mask was found that had been "forgotten" on Bornholm and even though there have been several observations of foreign submarines that have never been "confirmed."

Because of the Spetsnaz operations in Afghanistan and in the Swedish archipelago, Western military leaders have slowly but surely begun to take the threat seriously. Last year the British conducted large-scale maneuvers in Great Britain in which one specific goal was to combat infiltration and fifth-column activities. Last fall Norway allocated additional funds to train the police and the military to combat Spetsnaz activities.

9336

CSO: 3613/62

MILITARY

CONCERN RAISED OVER AIRFORCE PILOT, GROUND CREW DRAIN

Air Rescue Also Weakened

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 14 Jan 86 p 14

[Text] While the Air Force is having trouble maintaining its level of preparedness due to the pilot drain, its rescue service has been busier than ever. In the past year the number of hours in the air increased by 25 percent. Only in 1980 did the rescue service's S-61 helicopters make as many flights to assist people in distress at sea or provide transportation for the sick, according to the Air Force Tactical Command's review of 1985.

Some 295 people were rescued last year following shipwrecks or evacuation from ships and drilling platforms as a result of damage or acute illness. The biggest rescue operation took place in January when 62 passengers on the SAS hovercraft "Freia Viking" were evacuated after a collision on the northern tip of Saltholm in the Oresund.

Rescue helicopters made a total of 423 flights in 1985. That is two flights fewer than in 1980, which was a very unusual year in which southern Sjaelland and Lolland-Falster were covered by several meters of snow.

Last year it was transport of the ill that caused the statistics to rise to this record level. The Air Force carried out 141 patient transport services in all compared with 107 in 1984 and 64 the year before that. These were primarily urgent and vital transfers of patients from a local hospital to one with specialized facilities. Doctors on the small islands also use the helicopters to an increasing extent for the purpose of transporting seriously sick or injured patients to a hospital.

It was 20 years ago that S-61 helicopters were added to the Air Force rescue service. Since then the eight helicopters have carried out 6293 operations and rescued 3160 people. The Sikorsky helicopters probably have another 10 years of life before they need to be replaced, according to the Air Force Tactical Command.

The Air Force has gradually extended the period between safety checks from 100 hours in the beginning to 300 hours. A further extension to 350 hours is under consideration.

### SAS Recruitment Worries Minister

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 15 Jan 86 p 13

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard: "Government Wants to Solve Pilot Problem Now"; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE TIDENDE introduction]

[Text] The SAS management will be asked to attend an urgent meeting to discuss the mass hiring of military pilots. The defense minister called this unacceptable and pointed out that it could make it impossible to maintain the necessary level of preparedness.

The government considers it totally unacceptable that SAS is draining pilots from the Air Force and will invite the top management of the airline company to attend a meeting to discuss a solution as soon as possible, Defense Minister Hans Engell told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE.

At a cabinet meeting yesterday the minister gave his colleagues a report on the pilot situation in the Air Force, where it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain preparedness as a result of the inroads being made by SAS. SAS recently made job offers to 20 pilots. If they all accept, it will be hard to maintain preparedness and it might be necessary to shut down entire squadrons.

"It was decided that as soon as possible, probably in the coming week, we should invite the top SAS management to attend a meeting at which they will be informed that one of the SAS proprietors cannot accept this development," the defense minister said.

It is anticipated that the government will also announce that it will present a bill calling for a new civilian pilot training program as early as next month.

But there is not much chance that military pilots will be offered higher pay and better working hours. The main reason for the mass exodus from the Air Force is that the civilian airline companies offer pilots much better pay.

Like all other state employees, Air Force people are subject to the current contract terms. The government must bear in mind that many other employee groups would undoubtedly demand pay increases to match wages in the private labor sector if the government yields to the wishes of the pilots.

## Obligation Until 38 Proposed

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 17 Jan 86 p 10

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard: "Pilots Propose a Soft Landing"; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE TIDENDE introduction]

[Text] The top SAS management will meet with the Traffic Ministry today concerning the airline's tempting wage offers to Air Force pilots.

"It is not true that SAS offers Air Force pilots the moon," said SAS information chief Preben Kjaer against the background of the summons from the Defense and Traffic Ministries to top SAS management people to attend a meeting today where an effort will be made to make it clear to the airline that an attempt to drain the Air Force of pilots will not be tolerated.

At the same time the chairman of the Defense Pilots Society, Major N.G.R. Nielsen, proposed a compromise to Defense Minister Hans Engell that would allow the armed forces to retain pilots until they are 38 years old in return for certain wage and pension adjustments.

"It is not true that we are draining the Air Force of pilots," pilot chief Erik Thrane said. "Two years ago the Air Force informed us that it would like us to take in 28 pilots. That was impossible then, but in the present recruiting period we have accepted 14 and I anticipate that we will end up with 30." He also pointed out that in a crisis all Danish SAS pilots would be mobilized and that the same thing applied to the Danish share of 2/7 of the airline's planes.

"We in SAS are convinced that the problem will be solved to the satisfaction of both sides," said Preben Kjaer.

"As a proprietor the state does not want to annoy SAS while at the same time the state naturally wants the defense system to function as well as it possibly can."

## Important Arguments

The airline's negotiators, directors Frede Ahlgreen Eriksen and Jan Carlzon, will advance important arguments when they show up at the Traffic Ministry at 9:30 this morning.

"In the first place the beginning wages we can offer are lower than the trop wages paid by the armed forces. It is long-term employment that is the attractive feature.

"We will also point out that it is the pilots themselves who have sought to work for SAS. We have not been out trying to lure them in. It is a very unusual situation when a minister or the state tries to curtail the right of a Danish citizen to seek work freely.

"Finally the SAS negotiators will point out that the important thing is the Danish personnel quota. If Denmark cannot meet this quota we will lose it. We are in a situation where the Danish Pilots Society and the military pilots agree that they would like to keep these jobs. We cannot come back later and ask for them once we have let them go," Preben Kjaer concluded.

#### Minister Denies Readiness Harmed

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 21 Jan 86 p 7

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard: "Engell: Air Force Maintaining Full Readiness"; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE TIDENDE introduction]

[Text] No one at the top defense level will confirm reports that half of the pilots in the Air Force have submitted their resignations.

The Air Force's level of preparedness is being fully maintained and no one in the top defense leadership knows anything about rumors that half of the Air Force pilots have submitted their resignations.

This assurance was made to BERLINGSKE TIDENDE by both Defense Minister Hans Engell and the chief of the Air Force Tactical Command, Major General C.S. Borgesen.

"Only about 15-30 pilots have asked to leave and will be accepted in the spring training course at SAS," the major general said.

"I have no idea where the other pilots are supposed to have handed in their resignations or where they could expect to find jobs," Maj Gen Borgesen added.

State Pilot School Discussed

Defense Minister Hans Engell and Traffic Minister Arne Melchior recently discussed the pilot drain and the possibility of setting up a new state pilot school, partly financed by civil aviation, at a meeting with the two SAS directors, Jan Carlzon and Frede Ahlgreen Eriksen. The preliminary result was an agreement to meet again. In the meantime the Defense Ministry is studying a report prepared by a task force appointed by the Defense Command and an offer from the Defense Pilots Society concerning extending the contractual pilot service period in exchange for some kind of financial compensation.

But Hans Engell is not optimistic about this offer. "One must bear in mind that we are in the middle of a contract period and that it will not be possible to meet the pilots' economic demands," the minister said.

BALTAP Commander Expresses Concern

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 25 Jan 86 p 6

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard: "Pilot Drain No Threat to NATO"; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE TIDENDE introduction]

[Text] Some 18 pilots have left the Air Force since the beginning of the year and seven more have handed in their resignations in the hope of finding better pay and improved working conditions.

Eighteen Air Force pilots have resigned since the beginning of the year, with the resignations to become effective at the end of March, and up to last night another seven had submitted their resignations on condition that their demands for higher pay and better working conditions are not met, Defense Minister Hans Engell (Conservative) told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE.

The 18 resignations are quite normal while the seven others are "conditional resignations," in other words they are contingent on future developments. The Defense Command has sent these resignations for judicial review before making any response to them. But there have been no mass resignations, as rumored, the defense minister told us.

It is very difficult to form a clear impression of the pilot situation in the Air Force, mainly because there has been an element of union politics in the matter.

The peacetime norm for Air Force pilots is around 250, 135 of which are combat pilots. Since the beginning of the year the Defense Command has released 18 pilots, to take effect at the end of March. In 1985 the figure was 34 and in 1984 it was 11, but that does not mean that the Air Force is now 63 fighter pilots short, said Colonel K.B. Nielsen of the Defense Command's personnel division. "New pilots are being trained all the time and we also expect a steady rate of attrition."

"At the present time NATO has no reason to be concerned about the provision of reinforcements for Denmark or initial defense in the event of war," said Danish NATO Lieutenant General Niels-Aage Rye Andersen in the alliance's first authoritative comment on the loss of Danish Air Force pilots.

"The pilot situation is a purely national concern and the Defense Ministry, the Defense Command, the Traffic Ministry, the Education Ministry and SAS are all working together to find a solution to the problem, one that will have a long-range impact, and it must be anticipated that there could be some problems concerning Air Force readiness for a certain period of time," said General Rye Andersen, who is chief of BALTAP [Allied Forces Baltic Approaches]—the southern part of NATO's Northern Command.

"But," he added, "from a NATO point of view the situation is by no means threatening. We do not know at this time if it will become so in the future. But it is clear that a ratio of 1.35 pilots per F-16 airplane is desirable and a ratio below 1 is unfortunate, but it must be much lower than that before the situation poses a risk to readiness."

The general commented on the situation after unofficial sources at head-quarters in Karup said recently that the problem in the Air Force represents a threat to NATO security and that this could lead to the stationing of foreign air force troops in this country.

## Civilian Pilot School Proposed

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 23 Jan 86 p 3

[Article by Helle Ravn Larsen: "Training to Offset Pilot Drain"; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE TIDENDE introduction]

[Text] Education Minister Bertel Haarder (Liberal) is presenting legislation concerning a new training program for career pilots.

In an effort to offset the drain of pilots from the armed forces, Education Minister Bertel Haarder (Liberal) is proposing the establishment of a training program for career pilots. The theoretical education will be provided at the Aviation Education School while the elementary portion of the practical training will take place in the armed forces school for pilots following the same guidelines that apply to the corresponding portion of the training of military pilots.

In explaining the background for this training program the minister said that if the latest reported SAS need for Danish pilots is met solely by pilots leaving the Air Force it will seriously weaken the ability of the Air Force to fulfill its military and civilian obligations.

The minister expects to accept a class of 25 students each year although only 15-20 will probably finish the course. It is estimated that it will cost between 1 and 1.3 million kroner to train each career pilot. That is barely 10 percent of what it costs to train an Air Force pilot. Students can apply for admission as soon as the legislation has been approved and the first class will start training in the fall.

The airline companies will pay for the training. Bertel Haarder justified this by saying that this involves training to meet the needs of a very small and well-defined group of consumers for specially-trained personnel.

This training is also very costly per trained pilot and because of limits on public spending, the state cannot agree to pay for such a specialized, specific and expensive training program.

But the minister should not expect the airline companies to agree to this without a protest. In the past they have refused to enter into realistic negotiations on financing.

Ground Crew Shortage Problem

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 14 Jan 86 p 3

[Article by Berit Andersen: "Technician Shortage Grounds Aircraft"]

[Text] Copenhagen--The shortage of armed forces technicians is now so critical that in 2 weeks both airplanes and helicopters will be grounded with no chance of getting aloft.

And although immediate efforts would be made to remedy the situation, almost total paralysis would be inevitable.

This dire prediction was made by the technicians' organization, the Central Association of Permanent Military Personnel, CS, which gave precise details of the shortage of technicians at a recent meeting and outlined the consequences now and in the long run.

The consequences could be catastrophic for the civilian population. The small island communities risk total isolation. And vital services such as ambulance flights, searches for people in distress at sea, the transport of sick people from the Faeroe Islands to Denmark and many other services are in danger.

"The situation is critical. No immediate solution is possible," said Finn Busse Jensen, chairman of the Central Association. And he deplored the fact that the attention of the defense minister is focused solely on the pilot shortage.

There are specific problems with the Air Force's Hercules transport planes and the Navy's and the rescue squadron's helicopters. The latter are already being repaired at different places than they used to be and as far as the Hercules planes are concerned inspection periods have been extended far beyond the normal length of time.

This was confirmed by the head of the Vaerlose air base, Colonel R.S. Hansen. But he did not think the situation will be as serious as CS predicted. One of the reasons is that he considers it a solution of the problem to send aircraft to other countries for repairs.

"It is true that the situation is serious. And that is why we have realized that the necessary repairs and maintenance procedures cannot be carried out in this country. To avoid grounding planes we are currently considering having some work done in other countries," said Col R.S. Hansen.

The Central Association rejected this possibility as a solution to the acute situation.

Col R.S. Hansen stressed to AKTUELT that foreign contracting should be seen as an emergency solution because in the long run this is a more expensive way of getting the work done. But he also said that it would continue to be a possible solution "as long as we see wage differences of up to 6000 kroner a month for technicians in the armed forces and those in the civilian sector."

The Central Association was pleased that military employers are now also realizing how impossible these big wage differences are.

### C-130 Inspected in England

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 22 Jan 86 p 8

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE TIDENDE introduction]

[Text] The lack of personnel and an accumulation of tasks is forcing the Air Force to have a C-130 transport plane inspected abroad. But that is a one-time phenomenon, according to the Air Force Materiel Command.

The Air Force has decided to send one of its three C-130 transport planes to Great Britain because it lacks the technical personnel to carry out a routine inspection.

A spokesman for the airplane technicians at Vaerlose air base, Henning Wittus, said that the  $\Lambda$ ir Force now lacks so many technicians that only the most necessary repairs can be made.

In the past year around 65 technicians went into the private business sector, he added.

"That is not the whole truth," the technical leader of the Air Force Materiel Command, S. Aage Mygind, told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE. "The reason why we decided to send a C-130 plane to England is that an ongoing inspection of one of the transport planes is taking quite a long time and the two others are due to be inspected very soon.

"It has been necessary to take extraordinary steps to avoid coming into a situation where we have nothing at all to put in the air. The Air Force Materiel Command has sent some civilian technicians to the air base and at the same time we have decided to accept a British offer to carry out this one inspection very quickly. This will make it possible to offset the delay that has arisen in workshop capacity to some extent.

"But it is not planned to continue to send planes to England for service and we have started talks with the air base in an effort to find out how we can help each other in the future."

S. Aage Mygind did not wish to comment on the number of technicians who have left the Air Force. "But we do not lack as many as have left. You must remember that we also hire newly-trained technicians, even though they do not have as much experience as the older ones who have left," he added.

# Many Technicians Weigh Leaving

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 29 Jan 86 p 9

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard: "Technicians Also Leaving Air Force"; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE TIDENDE introduction]

[Text] The remaining technicians in Vaerlose are so overworked that half of them are considering civilian employment where wages are also higher.

In 1985 SAS employed 20 airplane technicians from the Air Force and almost as many went to other airline companies or to industry, according to the paper STAMPERSONEL, the organ for contract employees in the armed forces.

The chief of airplane maintenance at Kastrup, Georg Truelsen, told the paper that normally SAS trains its own technicians and that 1985 was an exception because the airplane fleet was expanded, resulting in an increase of 20 technicians.

In another article in the paper, the technicians' union leaders, Finn Busse Jensen and Henning Wittus, said that the attrition of technicians at the Vaerlose air base had been so extensive that those left behind face such a heavy work load that at least half of them are currently considering going into the civilian sector.

An airplane technician working for SAS gets a base pay of 84-90 kroner an hour, with additional amounts for working on Sundays and holidays or at night. The job also contains attractive possibilities of being assigned to other countries.

SAS has a number of Danish technicians stationed around the world and the company makes sure that personnel working abroad can maintain a "reasonable" standard of living in a foreign country.

6578

CSO: 3613/64

MILITARY

#### HOME GUARD DISTRICT CHIEF CITES FUNDS SHORTAGE PROBLEMS

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 2 Jan 86 p 3

[Article by Lars Villemoes]

[Text] Bureaucracy is threatening the home guard's status as a popular movement, according to the chief of Home Guard Region III, Col J. Frederik Edeling from Haderslev.

The colonel presented his criticism of the bureaucracy he believes has plagued the home guard's development from home guard associations to a governmental institution in the latest edition of the regional journal he publishes quarterly.

"Today we must live with a number of regulations that would never be required of a soccer club, for example," Colonel Edeling told INFORMATION.

## 1.5 Kg Paper

"There are all kinds of regulations placed on the administration and management of material and especially on our accounting system. Beginning on I January we became subject to new accounting regulations for workers at our treasurer's office and for our accountants. I can now say that the instructions that apply to my area, stacked on top of one another, weigh 1.5 kg. The paperwork is becoming a genuine burden to us," the colonel said.

## Separation

According to the orders from the Finance Ministry, the treasurer's office and bookkeeping department of the home guard districts are to be separate as of 1 January. In the past, money coming in and going out and the checking of receipts have been handled by workers at the treasurer's offices of the individual districts. "Many of the functions that previously occurred in the districts are now being transferred to the regions. We in Region III need to hire three new full-time officials to meet the requirements that are being forced down on us, which we must implement. The decision to separate the treasurer's office and the bookkeeping department is reasonable enough, but it will result in an unintended increase in administrative costs. We

must admit that we cannot obtain funding for these increased costs. The government is not interested in spending more on the home guard."

"But I cannot do the job with the personnel I have," the colonel said. "We need reinforcements, but even if our funding makes it possible to hire additional workers we will not send in our custodians to replace the book-keeper when he is out. Until the Defense Ministry tells us what to do, we will have to continue working, in part, according to the old regulations. But we cannot live up to the letter of the regulations. We on the regional level do not have the capacity to monitor receipts more closely," Colonel Edeling said.

#### Removed From Volunteers

"This is just the latest of a long series of orders that are threatening the popular nature of the home guard. We are becoming a governmental agency. We professionals of the home guard, who should be offering services to the volunteers, are now sitting in offices doing administrative work. I have complained loudly about this impending separation of the professionals from the volunteers. Unlike a government agency, the home guard is based on voluntarism and our administration must adapt itself to this idea. Otherwise, in the end, the volunteers will no longer want to participate," the colonel concluded.

## Working

Home guard commissioner Ole Bernt Henriksen could not say whether additional funding would be provided for employing office personnel at the home guard regions.

"But the new regulations take effect today, do they not?"

"We are working to adapt our system to the new regulations," he said.

9336

CSO: 3613/62

MILITARY

### REPORTERS VISIT AIR FORCE HAWK BATTERY AT STEVNS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 5 Jan 86 Sect IV p 8

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard]

[Text] It is rare that civilians have the opportunity to visit an anti-aircraft missile battery, but the air force and BERLINGSKE TIDENDE are now inviting our readers to go on an excursion to the missile battery near Hojrup Lighthouse at Stevns, where Denmark's eastern air spaces are observed day and night.

The top air defense organization of the air force, the Air Defense Group, now commands eight Hawk surface-to-air missile squadrons. One of these, squadron number 543, has its peacetime base at Stevns.

"This means that the missiles are ready for launching, of course, but if there is a so-called gray period before war breaks out, the battery will leave the base, which is believed to be well known by the enemy, and go to an entirely different site," said Captain K. Hansen, commanding officer at Skalstrup Air Base, to which the battery belongs.

The Hawk missile system was created in the United States during the late 1950's. Denmark received its first four squadrons in 1963. Since then, the system has undergone several improvements and is now called the I Hawk for the English "improved" Hawk.

Despite its age, with continued modernization the weapons system will be able to provide a significant portion of Denmark's air defenses until the year 2000. The missiles are leased from the United States at a cost of about 180 million kroner, or about half what it would cost to purchase similar weapons systems with a total of 72 missiles.

A Hawk squadron, such as number 543 at Stevns, includes about 100 men with two mobile scanning radar units, two radar units to determine the identity of planes, two missile sections of three launchers each, each of which has three missiles ready to fire, two control vehicles, and support material. This includes the necessary radio equipment for communications with other missile squadrons and higher command authorities.

Hawk missiles are designed primarily to shoot down planes at low and medium altitudes.

The two scanning radar units are used to detect planes. One scans air spaces at low and medium altitudes, while the other scans medium and higher altitudes. Two other radar units are used to identify incoming planes and, finally, the tracking radar begins its work. It locks in on the enemy plane and follows it, regardless of whatever diversions it makes, and sends its data to the missiles themselves. There are three of these missiles on each of the three mobile ramps, which can fire one missile at a time.

"We have over 20 years of experience with the Hawk missiles and have fired about 20 of them, all of which were direct hits," air force sources said.

"From time to time, peace groups try to depict the Hawk missiles as frightful weapons that can be equipped with nuclear charges and that would be targets for enemy nuclear missiles. This is part of the reasoning behind the heated debate in Odense, in connection with the establishment of a Hawk squadron on Funen."

"The fact is that these missiles are purely defensive and are equipped with conventional charges. It would be a waste of nuclear weapons to use them against a Hawk. Because of their high precision, they can do the job that is required of them with ordinary explosives."

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CSO: 3613/62

MILITARY

NEW RADAR DEVELOPMENT SEEN AIDING SEA SURVEILLANCE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 23 Jan 86 p 3

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard]

[Text] KRAS is the name of a new radar research project at the Institute of Electromagnetics of the Danish Institute of Technology (DTH).

The name of the project stands for Coherent Radar Technology and Advanced Signal Handling. The project will be financed by the Thomas B. Thrige Fund, which has approved 1.4 million kroner so far. The project is expected to cost 8.8 million kroner over a 5-year period.

The project was presented at DTH yesterday for Education Minister Bertel Haarder and a long list of interested parties from the world of research, the National Aviation Administration, the Air Force Materiel Command, the Defense Research Service, the Naval Materiel Command, the Waterways Directorate, and business and industry.

Great Importance For Sea Surveillance

Unlike conventional radar systems, coherent radar systems make it possible to measure distances and velocities simultaneously. They can also measure small changes at great distances, provide high resolution, and effectively suppress noise. This means that radar pictures taken through clouds or thick fog are almost as clear as aerial photographs taken from high altitudes in clear weather.

As a result, the system will be of great importance in sea surveillance, in radar applications at airports, and in meteorological observations. So far, the limiting factor in the coherent technology has been the inability to carry out the necessary signal handling and to purify the radar picture of noise pollution. This has now become possible, thanks to developments in high-speed digital electronics.

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CSO: 3613/62

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

SWISS ANALYSIS OF RESERVE, TERRITORIAL STRUCTURES, TRAINING

Lausanne REVUE MILITAIRE SUISSE in French Dec 85 pp 546-555

[Article by Division Col Denis Borel, retired: "A Look at the West German Army in 1985, 30 Years After its Establishment"]

[Excerpt] 4. Territorial Army ("Territorialheer")

- 4.1 In peacetime, the Territorial Army has only about 45,000 men on active duty (the nucleus of its units), whereas the bulk of its troops would be called up only in the event of a mobilization of reservists.
- 4.2 West German territory behind the combat zone assigned to NATO's army corps is divided into two territorial commands (North and South) whose boundary corresponds to the line separating the two NATO army groups and a (small) third one in the North Europe sector. Those commands are subdivided logically into zones, districts, and subdistricts.
- 4.3 The territorial commands have defense units (sedentary, mobile, and even mechanized) adding up to the following:
- a) The equivalent of 250 companies, either independent or split into platoons.
- b) The equivalent of 45 battalions (in 15 regiments).
- c) Twelve combat brigades ("Heimatschutzbrigaden") made up of two battalions of motorized infantry, one or two tank battalions, and one battalion of tractor-drawn artillery. (French reserve divisions have more or lest the same strength in manpower, but they have neither tanks nor artillery.)
- 4.4 The Territorial Army also has many logistic units solely for the support of West German troops, since each NATO state provides for the logistic requirements of only its own units.

The medical branch is designed differently than what we are trying to achieve in Switzerland: army medical troops would set up hospitals—some in friendly foreign territory—with a planned capacity of 180,000 beds solely for the German military (including airmen and sailors). The organization of wartime

medical service for the civilian population (which is greatly at risk because of the lack of modern shelters) is not known.

- 5. Use of Reservists
- 5.1 According to the "1985 White Paper," the Army has made preparations for the massive use of reservists. This would enable it to triple its manpower in case of wartime mobilization. (For their part, the French have plans to double the strength of their ground forces, but their training budget permits them to call up their reservists for only 1 week every 5 years.)
- 5.2 Since the Army trains about 170,000 soldiers every year, it has an appreciable number of reservists. It plans to make use of 710,000 of them. Even on the assumption that each annual class dwindles by 10 percent annually (due to deaths, unfitness, or expatriation), the six youngest classes should be sufficient to provide the required manpower.

The reservists are intended to:

- a) Bring the peacetime units up to regulation strength.
- b) Fill out the other permanent units.
- c) Set up a sizable number of small units and half a dozen large units.
- d) Set up personnel reserves that are decentralized (supernumerary battalions) and general.

We should point out that according to the "1985 White Paper," 140,000 engineer vehicles and items of equipment need to be available for requisition for use by those reservists. The preparations for requisitioning them have been made, and at times they have actually been requisitioned (the vehicles being returned as soon as they arrive at their units).

- 5.3 Let us attempt a rough calculation of the presumed distribution of reservists (although we do not have even approximate official figures).
- a) For bringing units with an active nucleus up to regulation strength:

Field Army	$(12 \times 3,000 + 3 \times 4,000)$	48,000
Territorial Army:		
Combat brigades (6)	$(6 \times 2,000)$	15,000
Staffs (120)	(120 x 200)	24,000

b) For setting up reserve units from scratch (Territorial Army):

Combat brigades (6)	$(6 \times 5,000)$	30,000
Regiments, companies,		
and defense platoons	(450 units x 200)	90,000
Hospital units (180,000 beds)	(1 man for 2 beds)	90,000
Support and traffic units	(hypothetical)	100,000

c) For setting up supernumerary battalions:

Field Army (for 36 brigades, 12 trp div, 3 trp CA = 51 x 1,000)

Territorial Army (80 territorial army + 12 brigades = 92 x 1,000)

Grand total 92,000

540,000

5.4 The above estimate, which strikes us as generously proportioned, therefore leaves a margin of 170,000 troops. We hazard the guess that they might constitute general reserves to compensate for initial losses and later casualties (the "1985 White Paper" stipulates, in fact, that some reservists will not be called up immediately in case of mobilization).

Switzerland does not have such reserves because it incorporates immediately into its troops—with a very modest quota of supernumeraries for each unit—all trained soldiers up to the age of 50 who are still fit for service.

# 6. Reserve Training

6.1 It is true that reservists who have completed their initial 15 months in the Field Army's companies can be integrated into them without difficulty.

Reservists between the ages of 21 and 26 are certainly still fit to carry out the duties for which they were trained during their 15 months of service in the permanent army. But if they must use different equipment when they enter the reserve, they must be called back for transitional training (we in Switzerland know that that is not always easy with the young men in our "Landwehr").

To ensure good cohesion in units consisting entirely of reservists, it seems essential to call them up frequently and for a substantial period.

It is crucial that reserve cadres be able to command their own troops often.

- 6.2 West German authorities are aware of that, and legislation provides an adequate legal framework for having good reserve units. Enlisted men can be subject to a total of 270 days of refresher and proficiency courses (213 days in Switzerland), compared to 450 days for NCO's and 540 days for officers. There are three types of courses ("Wehruebungen") for reservists, as follows:
- a) Individual service lasting from 3 to 4 weeks. This seems designed essentially for the advancement of cadres and the further training of specialists in schools.
- b) Alert exercises lasting from 2 to 3 days and intended to verify the speed with which the very young reservists who will provide the "skeleton" units with effective manpower can be mobilized on unexpected notice.
- c) Courses lasting 12 days or so for the training of entire reserve units at one time.

The authorities do their best to keep soldiers in the same reserve units for several years so that the men will be with familiar comrades every time they are called up for the courses, which are scheduled every 2 or 3 years. This is stated explicitly in the "1985 White Paper"—an indication that it does not yet seem apparent to everyone.

6.3 It is advisable now to see how those intentions have been put into practice, remembering that as far as we know, Switzerland is the only state actually required to carry out the "reservist" courses provided for by law. Authorities elsewhere may call up reservists—it all depends on their financial resources!

In 1984, according to the "1985 White Paper," 152,000 army reservists completed some type of training course (including probably 25,000 in schools and 25,000 in alert exercises). That leaves approximately 100,000 men who participated in what we would call additional training (2 weeks). If we deduct the 140,000 men assigned to supernumerary battalions, whose training could be skipped, that leaves 400,000 to be called up every 2 or 3 years. The figure of 100,000 indicates that overall, each unit is called up only every 4 years and that during the average of 6 years that each man spends in a unit, he is called up only once or twice (for from 12 to 24 days). That leaves us far short of the 270 days legally allowed, and officers command their troops only every 4 years at best.

- 6.4 It is understandable that such a situation should be a matter of concern to West German authorities and that the "1985 White Paper" should announce an increase to 400,000 during the 1990's in the number of men to be called up for one or the other of the three types of courses described above. To make that a reality, it will be necessary to obtain the necessary credits, particularly to enable the state to make up for the loss in civilian earnings. It will no longer be enough, as in the "1985 White Paper," to pay tribute to civilian employers and reservists for the financial sacrifices they make as a result of the "Wehruebungen." It may also be necessary for the state to purchase motor vehicles for training purposes to replace the civilian vehicles that cannot be requisitioned in peacetime.
- 6.5 To become an officer in the reserve (the "1985 White Paper" states that there are 40,000 who can be mobilized), a young West German must enlist for at least 2 years, at the end of which he becomes an officer cadet ("Faehnrich").

To become a lieutenant, he must complete an additional 12 months (a good part of which will necessarily be spent outside his reserve unit, which is rarely called up). There are courses for the training of future company and battalion commanders in the reserve. They apparently last for 4 weeks.

Only volunteers who enlist for 2 years or longer can become NCO's. According to the "1985 White Paper," over 100,000 of them, now in the reserve, are assigned to mobilizable troops.

6.6 In conclusion, we would like to draw the reader's attention to an accounting measure concerning reservists and the permanent army: the permanent

army's actual strength is somewhat below its budgeted strength, and the military authorities fill the gap by reporting 5,000 positions that are occupied in turn by reservists ("Wehruebende").

That is the mathematical result of dividing the 152,000 reservists called up in 1984 by 365 days.

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CSO: 3519/96

\*READINESS LAW\* ADVANCES IN PARLIAMENT

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 8 Jan 86 p 10

[Article: "Martial Law to Be Updated by Committee; Agreement on Readiness Bill Finally Reached"]

[Text] In the government's ministerial group for legal policy they have reached preliminary agreement on submitting the so-called time-of-crisis and readiness law to Parliament and also on initiating revision of the martial law in existence since 1930.

They intend to appoint a committee to determine the need for revising the martial law in connection with bringing up the readiness law for discussion in a session of the government.

Final decisions have not yet been reached in the government, nor have they agreed on the appointment and composition of the martial law committee. The readiness law is being drafted in the Justice Ministry and they are thinking of revising the martial law in the Defense Ministry.

A number of bills concerning the readiness law were drafted in committee as early as over 6 years agc, but revision of the law at that time got bogged down in the government due primarily to the opposition of the Left. They did not want new laws in the country that would restrict citizens' rights unless the old martial law was at the same time revised. Now the SDP [Social Democratic Party] is ready to release the readiness laws to Parliament if the committee at the same time goes ahead and cleans up the martial law.

The readiness laws are chiefly intended for those exceptional times between peace and a full-fledged state of war and to prepare for them. Through these laws the government would receive considerably broader powers than in normal times to organize the life of the society, the country's economy, defense matters, local administrations, the care of the sick, the employment of the labor force, the confiscation of property, etc. If a state of crisis should develop into a war, the martial law would go into effect.

The readiness law package will contain the powers of officials under the general statute and a number of laws on the readiness functions of the different sectors.

The general statute will be enacted in the order prescribed in the Constitution and the other laws in the simple order prescribed by virtue of it.

At the Justice Ministry they state that the readiness bill that has been drafted there is waiting for the Defense Ministry's position on the appointment of a committee to study the martial law. The Defense Ministry has not felt before that revision of the martial law was very necessary.

11,466 Cs0: 3617/56

### ARMED FORCES HOPES TO PROVIDE NEW UNIFORM DESIGN

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 24 Dec 85 p 9

[Article: "Cold-Weather Uniform, Equipment Belt, Protective Vest: There Will Be New Combat Equipment in the 1990's"]

[Text] Soldiers' equipment is being modernized. The most important new items are cold-weather uniforms, an equipment belt and protective vests.

The equipment belt will change the appearance of future recruit age groups in the most obvious way. It is really an improved version of the old combat belt. With its three pouches it looks like a small knapsack. So it can hold more equipment than before.

The equipment belt fits very neatly under the new pack. As for the latter, it is reminiscent of the tubular frame pack used by hikers.

The vest, which offers protection against shrapnel and bullets fired from a distance, has been designed for combat troops. Yet to be tested is how the vest fits with the equipment belt. A completely bulletproof vest has proven to be too heavy.

The troops already have the new cold-weather gear. The complete outfit includes a cold-weather suit and boots: There is a detachable felt lining inside the rubber boots. Better overall materials than before are being developed and studied at the present time. The cold-weather outfit must be adaptable to the needs of as many types of weapons as possible.

The new items are not expected to be in use before the 1990's. The Armed Forces, however, fear that there may not be enough money. For example, there may not be enough to purchase equipment belts and packs for the entire field army, the General Staff stated.





The cold-weather outfit must be adaptable to the needs of as many types of weapons as possible. There are many pockets.

The new equipment belt is like a small knapsack.



A round fired from a distance ricochets off the stylish-looking protective vest.



Fully equipped, the 1990's recruit will remind one as much of an Arctic hiker as of a soldier.

11,466 CSO: 3617/53

# BORDER GUARD WEIGHING PURCHASE OF ANTISUB HELICOPTER

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 4 Jan 86 p 6

[Article: "Procurement of Sea Rescue Helicopters Runs into Difficulties When Authorization to Order Them Is Canceled"]

[Text] The lengthy, complicated process of the procurement of Border Patrol sea rescue helicopters has again suffered a setback, since the 100-million-markka authorization to order them issued by Parliament in the 1985 budget was canceled at the end of the year.

They had time to order only one helicopter costing about 15 million markkas on the basis of the authorization. At least in the Border Patrol they have no exact knowledge of any additional helicopters, that is, the fate of the remaining unused approximately 85 million. Resumption of the procurement process with probably be possible through next year's first supplementary budget at the earliest.

A planned order for medium helicopters to replace Soviet Mi-8 helicopters have been indefinitely postponed, above all because of differences over price. These have also led the Border Patrol to look into an alternative whereby the medium helicopters would not be procured at all, but would be substituted for by a larger number than planned of light, twin-engine Agusta-Bell AB-412 helicopters.

When it approved the 1985 budget, Parliament concurred with the opinion of several experts and the committee that had studied the matter of sea rescue helicopters, the opinion that the helicopters the Border Patrol now has in use are not sufficiently well suited to maritime operations. They, the light Agusta-Bell Jet Rangers and medium Mi-8's, must therefore be replaced with new, more suitable ones.

For this reason, Parliament decided that "in 1985 we may conclude agreements on and send in orders for 100 million markkas worth of helicopters and equipment for them." According to the budget, the authorization will result in payments of 20 million markkas in 1986 and of 40 million markkas during the following 2 years. In addition to these, they stated that it would be necessary to provide money for payments incurred by changes in indicators and foreign exchange rates.

### Authorization Was Too Small

The Border Patrol has worked out a renewal of its sea rescue equipment on the basis of the report of the committee chaired by ex-general manager K.J. Temmes. In the spring of 1984 the committee suggested that rescue missions could quite well be handled with three medium and three light helicopters. They can manage somehow with two medium and three light helicopters, but limiting the number of helicopters to two in both size classes would create insurmountable difficulties.

The Agusta-Bell 412 was chosen as the new light type in the fall of 1984 when the first of these twin-engine aircraft was ordered. It arrived in the country last fall, late. They had intended to order one more 412 and two of the successors to the Mi-8 with the 100 million there was in last year's budget. They managed to order the 412, but the 85 million that was left after that was no longer enough to procure the larger aircraft. Nor was there time for them to clear up all the technical details of the procurement before the cancellation of the authorization at the end of the year either.

According to Col Matti Autio, the chief of the Border Department of the Border Patrol, three more manufacturers are offering bigger aircraft. Autio did not want to name them individually, but they are presumably the French firm, Aerospatiale, the American Sikorsky and the English Westland.

Nor was Autio interested in saying how short the authorization to order equipment that has now been canceled leaves them. The Border Patrol is trying to get a new authorization into this year's first supplementary budget, but it would at best be approved not before early summer. "We do not even know that for certain; usually, when such matters are prolonged, they get more complicated," Autio sighed, with the experience produced by a procurement process that has lasted for years.

### Medium Copters May Be Abandoned

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Since the medium helicopters will scarcely be decisively cheaper next summer than they are now, at the Border Patrol they have also made preliminary studies of new alternatives in the event that the authorization to order equipment is not markedly increased with respect to the one that has just been canceled.

One alternative is to completely abandon the medium copters and resort solely to the AB-412 equipment. Up to now this has been considered to be impossible for two reasons.

There have been no rotor deicers on the AB-412, which is why they cannot be used in freezing weather. Rescue missions may, however, have to be flown in any kind of weather whatsoever.

The second reason is that, according to the Temmes committee, they must be able to use sea rescue copters for submarine surveillance too. The sonar equipment necessary for this purpose has not up to now been installed on the AB-412.

the problems are now being eliminated since both rotor deicers and sonar inin-lialization are now available for the Agusta-Bell. At the Border Patrol they are now investigating whether sea rescue copter missions could be carried out with just rive AB-412 copters.

## CURRENT STATE OF CIVIL DEFENSE REVIEWED

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Jan 86 pp 65-82

[Article by Jean-Francois Durantin, research fellow at CIRPES: "Commissioners of the Republic and Civil Defense"; first paragraph is DEFENSE NATIONALE introduction]

[Text] Jean-Francois Durantin wrote this most interesting and topical article with guidance from Hubert Jean-Pierre Thomas, director of the National Defense Sociology Center, in connection with a research seminar on the French military system. Authoritative references consulted by the author include recent parliamentary advisory opinions and reports, and laws and regulations covering organization of the defense establishment and reform of the decentralization laws.

# Topicality of Civil Defense

This topicality is attributable to the obvious revival of interest in civil defense within parliamentary and governmental circles, and also to the redefinition of the powers of the representatives of the central government as a result of the decentralization laws. Although civil defense does not consist solely of passive defense and protection of the civil population, it does not encompass the entire nonmilitary defense policy, inasmuch as economic defense is the responsibility of the Ministry of Economy.

Civil Defense Organization at Central Government Level

The Ministry of Interior is in charge of civil defense, whose objectives are three in number: maintenance of law and order, physical and moral protection of persons, and safety of installations and resources. Yet, even though coordination of all civil defense matters is handled by the General Secretariat for National Defense (SGDN), which is directly responsible to the prime minister, three separate ministries share in these coordination responsibilities and function as assistant coordinators.

The Ministry of Defense handles diplomatic, transportation, and communications problems having an impact on civil defense operations.

The Ministry of Interior is assigned responsibility for the security of infrastructures so that the government can continue to carry out its responsibilities in all fields, and particularly in public health matters. In addition to its senior defense official, this ministry contains two major directorates charged with implementing the provisions of the Statute of 1959. These two staff activities are the General National Police Directorate (maintenance of law and order, protection of key nonmilitary points) and the Civil Security Directorate (protection of the civilian population and administration of relief services in the event of accidents, disasters, or war).

The Ministry of Economy has jurisdiction in matters relating to such national defense imperatives as price control policy, customs policy, and procurement of supplies as well. The Energy and Energy Raw Materials Watch Agency  $^2$  ("observatoire") was created for this purpose.

These three ministries are presumed to work together to facilitate transmission of major civil defense policy orientations to the central government's various territorial echelons.

Current Powers of Commissioners of the Republic

# A New Approach

The new civil defense relations instituted by the decentralization laws are designed to secure the rights and freedoms of the communes and departments by joining devolution and decentralization as closely as possible. The difficulties encountered in accomplishing this are clearly shown by: Article 11 of Decree No 82-389, dated 10 May 1982, implementing Law No 82-213, dated 2 March 1982; Article 26 of Law No 83-8, dated 7 January 1983; and especially Decree No 83-221, dated 20 April 1983, relative to the powers of commissioners of the republic in nonmilitary defense matters.

## Devolution's Priority Over Decentralization

Although these decrees and laws do constitute an indispensable clarification of the respective jurisdictions of the commissioners of the republic and the communes and departments in these matters, their actual implementation is the subject of divergent interpretation within the Interior Ministry between the General Directorate of Administration and the Directorate of Communes and Departments, as well as between the Interior Ministry itself and several other ministries, including those responsible for urban planning and the environment.

These new legislative and regulatory provisions follow directly from the decrees of 29 January 1962 on economic defense, 13 January 1965 on civil defense, and 12 October 1967 on territorial organization of the latter. Yet they in no wise resolve all the problems liable to face the conduct of everyday relations between commissioners of the republic and territorial administrations. Nevertheless, these new decrees and laws do have the merit of granting devolution

priority over decentralization, to the extent that, in such matters, compliance with suggestions imposed by national defense considerations<sup>5</sup> implies serious limits to transfers of powers between the central government and freely administered communes and departments, with the commissioner of the republic becoming guardian of the new boundary thus established. It is logical, therefore, to assume that the powers of communes and departments in nonmilitary defense matters will be restricted somewhat.

## Residual Powers of Communes and Departments

A nuanced evaluation of Article 26 of Law 83-8, dated 7 January 1983, would consist in interpreting it on the basis of two criteria. The first is compliance with suggestions imposed by national defense to which communes and departments remain subject. The second is the different period during which nonmilitary defense measures are likely to apply.

The first criterion leads to the acknowledgement that these communes and departments have limited delegations of powers in defense matters, with the commissioner of the republic reserving the right to refer to the administrative court any decision made by the head of the local executive which exceeds the terms of Article 26.6 These delegations of powers could under no circumstances extend to delegation of control procedures, for which the commissioner of the republic's reform authority must be exercised at all times in the local executive's stead.

The second criterion refers to the division of legal responsibilities according to the nature of the emergencies and their degree of gravity. Thus there are three distinct categories of periods: normal periods in which the reciprocal defense information of the commissioner of the republic and the communes and departments does not exclude referral of a dispute to the administrative court; the declared state of emergency (law of 1955) in which the commissioner of the republic's substitution authority can be exercised at any time; and defense emergencies, with internal aggression, which imply a declared state of siege (law of 1849) situation and hence a transfer of powers to the military authorities (stage at which the territorial opeational defense (DOT) is activated).

#### Persistent Problems

These various observations do not exhaust the subject. In addition to the traditional problem of coordination with the military authorities, there is the problem of intervention by commissioners of the republic in urban planning and environmental matters, intervention resulting from the laws on transfer of powers.

## Coordination with Military Authorities

Article 21 of the Statute of 7 January 1959 aligns the territorial boundaries of the military districts with those of the special administrative defense districts. Despite these provisions, today there continues to be disagreement between the different echelons over the respective jurisdictions of the civil

and military authorities. Agreement exists only at the defense area level where the commanding general of the military region is adviser to the defense area's commissioner of the republic whose authority includes administration, control, coordination, and execution of nonmilitary defense measures. 8 In addition, the Statute of 7 January 1959, as amended, makes explicit provision for a senior civil official to control nonmilitary defense efforts. 9

On the other hand, while military authority is firmly established at the regional level (by the military division), the regional commissioner of the republic has but partial jurisdiction in civil defense matters, whereas he has overall jurisdiction in economic defense matters. This situation is the logical consequence of the principle of speciality which today still governs the regional establishment (law of 2 Mar 1982, paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 59, and paragraph 5 of Article 79).10

The situation at the departmental level is just the opposite. The imbalance there is aggravated by the provisions of the decree of 20 April 1983, in that the departmental commissioner of the republic's powers in civil defense matters are detailed at length (articles 2 to 8)—even though these powers have to do mainly with the planning, execution, and regulation authority stemming from Article 26 of the law of 7 January 1983—whereas the delegated departmental military representative exercises no command authority and can, apart from his role as military adviser, only transmit orders received from the regional level.11

Intervention of Commissioners of the Republic in Urban Planning and Environmental Matters

Despite the provisions of Articles 6 and 11 of the decree of 20 April 1983, direct intervention by commissioners of the republic in urban planning matters, and particularly in regard to building permits for fallout shelters, is considered likely only during the preparation stage of land-use plans, inasmuch as building permits are now granted by mayors. As a result, the prime minister's directive of 15 October 1982 on compliance with fallout and blast protection standards, is currently difficult to implement, even though it is limited in scope, being applicable solely to public shelters accommodating more than 100 persons each. 12

While the region's powers in environmental matters are well established, with the law of 2 March 1982 making explicit provision for "the preservation of regional identity," the central government representative's powers, ways, and means, fully coordinated for once, are, nevertheless, not defined beyond the ORSEC [Disaster Relief Organization] plan (Article 2 of the law of 2 March 1982). The POLMAR plan covers only maritime disasters, and measures for implementation of other emergency plans are less specific; 13 accordingly what would happen in the event of a chemical disaster caused by, for example, massive diffusion of dioxin in the atmosphere near a large urban center? At the present time, there are no specific provisions for action by commissioners of the republic, at any level, except that, for public health purposes, each prefecture 15 maintains a list of laboratories capable of detecting lethal chemical agents, 14 and another list of intensive care facilities for severe burn cases and persons poisoned by any kind of toxic substance.

It can be said, therefore, that although the civil defense organization does have an elaborate legal structure, its administrative structure is such that it produces many instances of overlapping or poor coordination, indeed even makes it ill-adapted to the risks incurred. Consequently, the civil defense organization should be made more efficient by increasing the coordination powers of the commissioners of the republic.

Proposals for Better Coordination

A Few Simple Objectives

Filling the gap existing between military policy and nonmilitary defense at the highest governmental level would permit better integration of military defense planning and nonmilitary defense planning at area, regional, and departmental levels. 16 If this handicap were removed, nothing would then stand in the way of an enhanced incorporation of civil defense within the conjunctive fabric of local governments, and a greater assumption of responsibility for the various aspects of economic defense, on the initiative of the commissioners of the republic.

Filling the Gap Between Military Policy and Nonmilitary Defense

Unity of defense (prime minister's directive dated 29 September 1959) has thus far remained a dead letter because of the multiple ministerial overseers pressing upon nonmilitary defense and thereby precluding that unity of command which prevails in military defense. Creation of a secretariat of state directly responsible to the prime minister for civil defense does not appear to be an adequate response to the problem. 17

national defense establishment, it is necessary not only to restore powers 18 to the General Secretariat for National Defense (SGDN) by more clearly defining the civil defense and economic defense clauses of Decree No 78-78 dated 25 January 1978, but also permit the SGDN, directly responsible to the prime minister, to fully perform its duties by replacing the Division of General Defense Affairs with a Division of Military Affairs linked directly to the armed forces general staff, and also by expanding the Division of Defense Civil Affairs to encompass all nonmilitary defense missions. 19

Attaching civil administrative officers, prefects and subprefects to the latter division would be the first condition of success for a real policy of devolving some nonmilitary defense measures upon all echelons of the central government's external services directed by commissioners of the republic. The second condition would consist in merging all interministerial committees and commissions dealing with military defense, territorial defense, security, civil defense, 20 and economic defense matters into one single body; into an "Interministerial National Defense Committee" chaired by the secretary general for national defense, 21

The credibility of the reorganization of the SGDN would be enhanced by passage of a programming law for civil defense. This law would consolidate appropriations now dispersed throughout the SGDN's civil programs for defense,

civil security appropriations, and those appropriations for the civil defense effort of the different ministries. This law could be a section added to the military programming law that would be formulated at the same time. The civil defense programming law should be prepared jointly by the SGDN, area commissioners of the republic, and interested ministries compulsorily represented by their respective senior defense officials. This preparatory work would constitute the final stage in arbitration of the decentralized civil defense programs prepared with guidance from the commissioners of the republic.

Better Incorporation of Civil Defense Within the Conjunctive Fabric of Local Governments

An efficient civil defense system has to combine simplified administrative structures and its final objectives, clearly outlined by the officials responsible for our country's destinies, with the approval of our people, an approval freely and knowingly given.

From this point of view, the commissioner of the republic's role is seen as that of a two-way messenger between the central government and the citizenry. Hence it would appear well-advised to associate the local executive and representatives of associative movements in preparation of the general protection plan and emergency relief plans, prerogatives of the departmental commissioner of the republic, pursuant to Article 4 of the decree of 20 April 1983. This administrative embryo could assume the form of civil defense advisory councils<sup>23</sup> formulating decentralized programs and contributing to enlightenment of the subsequent discussions of Parisian experts and then of Parliament.

This expanded role of the department as the basic cell of civil defense implies that the departmental interministerial defense office be given a key position on the prefecture's organizational chart by adding a permanent departmental information and coordination center to that office. 23

Because to date the region constitutes a compulsory common-law echelon only within its own area of jurisdiction (general powers clause in Aricle 1 of the law of 7 January 1983), we can be satisfied with maintaining therein such decentralized structures as a regional interministerial defense office and a regional information and coordination center converted into a permanent activity.

Yet the prevention of bacteriological or chemical disasters acutely raises the issue of attaching an operational resources management section to the regional commissioner of the republic, a prerequisite to increased coordination of all disaster relief operations whenever several departments are involved.  $^{24}$ 

Lastly, at the area defense secretariat level, in addition to an identical conversion of the information and coordination center into a permanent activity, the area defense committee's annual meeting—which compiles a list of key points and approves emergency plans<sup>23</sup>—could be preceded by the area commissioner of the republic's consultation with regional executives.

Strengthen, Alongside Civil Defense, Economic Defense Against Various Dangers of Environmental Pollution

A regional economic defense board could be reactivated<sup>23</sup> to assist the regional commissioner of the republic in preparing different measures relative to the aforementioned meeting, and plans for the use of resources and infrastuctures. The board's membership would be drawn from the economic and social committee plus the general secretariat for regional affairs, provided, however, that the board be chaired by the regional commissioner of the republic. The board would be a study and consultative group available to the latter and to the president of the regional council as well. The board would be assigned such tasks as bacteriological and chemical pollution control, surveillance of vital economic facilities (nuclear power plants, oil and gas pipelines), and lastly, prevention of acts of terrorism and sabotage in the field of modern technologies (shielding computers from artificial electromagnetic pulses (EMP).<sup>25</sup>

This is actually a major effort to make prefectural administrative staffs and members of economic and social committees thoroughly aware of the essential and still ill-perceived objectives of economic defense.

Better Defined Ways and Means

Obtaining the ways and means that would enable commissioners of the republic to coordinate more effectively these new civil defense structures is dependent on three imperative actions: keeping the public informed, training key personnel and implementing selective policies, and establishing financial mechanisms with tax incentives.

Keeping the Public Better Informed and Prepared to React

Information disseminated to our citizens, and well understood by them, must not dwell solely on the spectacular aspect of the catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons. It must also caution them against the risks of terrorist activities causing serious chemical or bacteriological pollution.

This information can be given in several forms. The prime minister regularly issues instructions to commissioners of the republic outlining ways of protecting the public. The press office in each prefecture should be able to disseminate the more important of these instructions. The same is true with the brochure "Learn and Live" be which, updated, could be distributed to young married couples, imitating thereby the action of Swiss authorities. Similarly, significant extracts from reports of the French High Committee for Civil Defense could, after the prime minister's review and approval, be the subject of insets in the press. Interministerial defense offices would, for their part, be responsible for preparing official instructional notices describing the principal measures to be taken in case of disasters adversely affecting the ecosystem's balance, and then transmitting these notices to mayors for appropriate display.

Despite its firm resolve repeatedly reaffirmed since 1982, 28 it is only in a very ad hoc manner and with no real master plan that the central government has initiated some modest and still unfinished projects designed to give the people a diversity of means with which to counter aggressions endangering their very lives or impairing their environment for a long time. This deficiency may be ascribable to the fact that a disaster due to a pollution incident of regional importance has occurred only once on our territory (wreck of the supertanker "Amoco Cadiz" off the coast of Brittany), 27 and that our nuclear deterrent has retained its credibility.

Commissioners of the republic can act to correct this deficiency by accommodating our needs to our means, while still maintaining continuity. The more the means of countering aggressions are decentralized and tailored to the multiple threats, the more effective the reinforcement of our civil defense.

This principle must be kept in mind when dealing with the following points: constitution and distribution of stockpiles of strategic materials and food products, a judicious protection policy, a survey of our capability to evacuate and disperse urban populations, a reliable emergency warning system, and an efficient disaster relief organization.

As for the first point, a joint plan for stockpiling these commodities is currently under study by EEC countries. 29 This plan cannot be seriously considered unless it proposes to constitute the largest and most important stockpiles in those countries farthest from the Central Europe theater of operations, and unless it provides for exchanges that are as diversified as possible. One possible objection to this ambitious project is the fact that it would be necessary to grant absolute priority to the routing and transport of our most commonly used strategic materials and food products throughout our national territory, a responsibility which is essentially that of the area commissioner of the republic and which, pursuant to Article 15 of the decree of 20 April 1983, makes it incumbent on him to ensure that regional and departmental commissioners of the republic act accordingly.

As for the second point, a protection policy, adapted to our people's turn of mind and our economy, can cover, initially, only whatever is indispensable to the war effort. From a technical standpoint, we must build two types of shelter systems. One is for the protection of key points and consists of shelters capable of withstanding pressures of 3 to 4 bars. The other type is less sophisticated but designed to provide, on a priority basis, radiation shielding for the protection of hospital facilities. 30 These two systems combined would require installation of 200,000 shelters covering 2 to 3 percent of the national territory. In addition, citizens would be completely free to build their own shelters if they wished to do so. The policy of having commissioners of the republic systematically inventory shelters would be justified only by incorporating these above changes. An annual report by departmental commissioners of the republic on the status of the protection policy seems useful however.

With regard to the third point, the survey of our capability to evacuate and disperse urban populations consists first in regularly verifying that our

transportation infrastructure is in serviceable condition, while giving priority to the evacuation of urban centers by rail. An annual report by regional commissioners of the republic evaluating the actions taken in this field, can help to speed up these emergency movements of the civilian population.

With respect to the fourth point, the warning and emergency communications system will be all the more reliable once the public knows how the system works and radio communications security is assured. In compliance with Article 9 of the decree of 20 April 1983, regional commissioners of the republic must see to it that ministerial orders issued on this subject are enforced.

Lastly, with regard to the fifth point, creation of a swift-acting and efficient emergency relief organization consists in completing the defense corps, planned since 1972, by insisting on activation of the 108 companies-consolidating the 380 emergency housing detachments tailored each subprefecture, 31-deployment of which is the responsibility of the assistant commissioner of the republic, pursuant to Article 6 of the decree of 20 April 1983.

Increased Training of Key Personnel and Implementation of Selective Policies

Training prefectural staffs to perform nonmilitary defense tasks depends on three priority actions.

Basically, the interministerial defense offices cannot function without sufficient operating and investment funds. Principally, however, increased attendance at sessions of the IHEDN [National Defense Institute for Advanced Studies] by members of the prefectural corps is the sine qua non for making commissioners of the republic fully aware of their important civil defense responsibilities.

Rather than conduct expensive nationwide emergency warning exercises, preference could be given to exercises directed from the regional prefectures. On the other hand, attachment of a subprefect as assistant for economic defense matters to the general secretariat for regional affairs does seem to meet the imperative requirements of the moment.

Lastly, senior defense officials in ministries of the central government must be fully capable of performing the tasks assigned to them under the decree of 3 April 1980. In this connection, in addition to their participation in the preparation of regulations and directives within their purview, <sup>32</sup> they could conceivably be given fact-finding missions and also the task of coordinating civil defense actions taken by commissioners of the republic.

In another connection, the necessity of continuing the modernization of the Strategic Nuclear Force and completing deployment of the Rapid Action Force, coupled with current budgetary constraints, are all generating pressure to slash civil defense expenditures to the bone. Consequently, systematic implementation of selective policies is the only method of developing the

equipment and facilities essential to that defense. Such is the case with the previously discussed protection policy. And such should also be the case with the hardening of sensitive technologies to shield them from artificial electromagnetic pulses. 33 When incorporated in the cost of building new technologies, this hardening would raise their price only 3 to 5 percent. Furthermore, medical school curriculums and training programs for public administrators and military leaders should contain one of more compulsory courses on protection against the radiation effects of nuclear weapons. 34

Establishing Financial Mechanisms with Tax Incentives for Use by Commissioners of the Republic

In regard to passage of a programming law for civil defense, an initial 5-year plan providing for annual outlays of 10-12 billion francs<sup>35</sup>--roughly equivalent to the annual cost of the program for rewiring our large cities with optical fibers--would be sufficient to fund the nonmilitary defense measures proposed in this article, it being understood that at the end of 5 years, this funding responsibility should be gradually assumed by regions and departments.

All the new structures we have suggested be established for the commissioners of the republic should make it easier to estimate the civil defense funds required for each prefecture. These structures should also enable territorial jurisdictions to participate in the process of preparing the financial part of nonmilitary defense measures.

Commissioners of the republic can be expected to recommend a set of financial measures to departmental executives. These measures would encourage establishment of certain limited tax deductions for communes and departments, deductions based on the amount of capital investment allocated to civil defense and economic defense. In any case, the role of commissioners of the republic in the choice of investments must be viewed as that of promoters and regulators between the departmental councils participating in the formulation of national financial plans and the regions which, by law, 36 have the final say in this process. The commissioners' role also consists in ensuring, under the supervision of departmental and regional chief treasurers and paymasters, that capital spending on nonmilitary defense projects is proper and according to plan.

### Conclusion

The decree of 20 April 1983 contains multiple potentialities as far as the powers of the commissioners of the republic in nonmilitary defense matters are concerned. These potentialities are a good example of how the responsibilities of the central government's representatives are being redefined pursuant to the law of 2 March 1982. This redefinition outlines the tasks now assigned to these representatives who must be not only the compulstory channels to a successful decentralization—which could go hand in hand with a resurgence of the local consultative administration—but also the key factors of a devolution which, by clearing away the central government's congested powers, would make the measures taken by that government more understandable to all citizens.

The decree of 20 April 1983 has also served to underscore the necessity of having military defense and nonmilitary defense proceed at the same pace. The civil and economic aspects of nonmilitary defense remain complementary. A better perception of the exigencies of economic defense by administrative and military officials is essential at a time when the highest governmental authorities are assigning to the commissioners of the republic the mission of being "the war lords of the economic and social battle".<sup>37</sup> They could, therefore, be the "missi dominici" [envoys of the master: reference to Charlemagne's agents sent in pairs, one layman and one clergyman, to check on local authorities] in charge of explaining and taking all concrete actions fulfilling "the ardent obligation" of civil defense <sup>38</sup> and its indispensable complement, economic defense. In this way, the commissioners would fully perform their duty as mediators between the central government on the one hand, and the people and their elected representatives on the other, thereby bringing civil defense closer to our citizens.

## FOOTNOTES

- 1. Statute No 59-147, 7 January 1959, as amended, establishing the overall defense organization, JOURNAL OFFICIEL, 10 January 1959.
- 2. Ministerial order of 29 June 1982.
- 3. Marcel Blanc, "Aspects of Defense Problems Yesterday and Today," ADMINISTRATION, review of the association of the prefectural corps and senior officials of the Interior Ministry, No 123, March 1984, pp 72-76.
- 4. Paper by Jean Le Direach, read at the university studies and research seminar on public spirit and defense in France, organized by the SGDN in Paris, 19-20 September 1984.
- 5. Law No 83-8, 7 January 1983, relative to the distribution of powers among communes, departments, regions, and the central government, Article 26, JOURNAL OFFICIEL, 9 January 1983, p 217.
- 6. Jean Le Direach, op. cit.
- 7. Jean-Pierre Boivin, "Territorial Organization of National Defense," p 8; and Georges Mege, "Civil Defense: Missions and Territorial Structures"; both quoted by Michel Rousset in "Civil Defense in France: Problems and Prospects", AkES (4), 1981. Also see the booklet published by SIRPA [Armed Forces Information and Public Relations Service]," Overall Defense Organization", August 1983, pp 18-19.
- 8. Article 15, Decree No 83-321, 20 April 1983, relative to the powers of the commissioners of the republic in nonmilitary defense matters, JOURNAL OFFICIEL, 21 April 1983, p 1241.
- 9. Statute No 59-147, 7 January 1959, as amended, Article 23, JOURNAL OFFICIEL, 10 January 1959.

- 10. Law No 82-213, 2 March 1982, relative to the rights and freedoms of communes, departments, and regions, JOURNAL OFFICIEL, Document No 1512-1, 1982, pp 41, 45.
- 11. Michel Rousset, op. cit., p 85.
- 12. "Fact-finding Report on Civil Defense," submitted by Mme Florence d'Harcourt, member of the National Assembly (second ordinary 1983-1984 session of the National Assembly, appendix to record of proceedings and debates of 30 May 1984 meeting, No 2166, pp 57-58).
- 13. Paul Bernard, "The State and Decentralization, from Prefect to Commissioner of the Republic," in NOTES ET ETUDES DOCUMENTAIRES, Documentation Francaise, No 4711-4712, March 1983, pp 185-186. Also noteworthy is the Cabinet's decision of 12 January 1983 to improve the consistency of emergency and relief plans for dealing with a major disaster.
- 14. "Fact-Finding Report on Civil Defense," submitted by Mme Florence d'Harcourt, op. cit., pp 30-32.
- 15. Report by senior defense official, Ministry of Interior and Decentralization, 1983.
- 16. Michel Rousset, op. cit., Note (8).
- 17. "Fact-Finding Report on Civil Defense," submitted by Mme Florence d'Harcourt, op. cit., p 129; and "Advisory Opinion on Government Proposed 1985 Budget", Vol 5, Civil Defense, submitted by Senator Paul Girod (first ordinary 1984-1985 session of the Senate, appendix to record of proceedings and debates of 19 November meeting, No 74, p 42).
- 18. Michel Rousset, op. cit., Note (8).
- 19. Organizational chart of General Secretariat for National Defense (SGDN), CEDOCAR [Armed Forces Documentation Center], 3d quarter 1984.
- 20. The interministerial civil defense committee was created by a 1965 interministerial order. In abeyance as of 1966, it was reconvened in plenary session on 5 March 1985 by decision of Pierre Joxe, minister of interior and decentralization, LE MATIN, No 2542, Tuesday 7 May 1985, p 16.
- 21. "Fact-Finding Report on the Level of Protection for the French Civilian Population in a Period of Emergency", submitted by Senators Raymond Marcellin and Edouard Bonnefous on behalf of the finance, budgetary oversight, and national economic accounts committee (Senate's second ordinary 1979-1980 session, appendix to record of proceedings and debates of 29 April 1980 meeting, No 236, p 112).
- 22. Marcellin-Bonnefous report, op. cit., p 120: "Drawing up a Program Law".
  This proposal was adopted by the French High Committee for Civil Defense.
  It is also referred to, under the designation of "programming law," in the

"Fact-Finding Report on Civil Defense", submitted by Mme Florence d'Harcourt, op. cit., p 128, and in the "Advisory Opinion on the Government Proposed 1985 Budget," submitted by Paul Girod, op. cit., Appendix 3, p 62 and onward.

- 23. Recommendations of Mme Florence d'Harcourt's report, pp 65-66, "Role of Defense Agencies".
- 24. Article 9, Decree No 83-321, 20 April 1983, paragraph 2.
- 25. Artificial electromagnetic pulses (EMP) are very high intensity radio waves of very short duration. They can so overload electric circuits as to damage or destroy transistors and integrated circuits.
- 26. Prepared, for the first time, under Georges Pompidou's presidency (1972).
- 27. Report of parliamentary investigating committee formed pursuant to the senatorial resolution of 27 April 1978 following the stranding of a supertanker off the coast of Brittany. The report was presented by the following senators: Andre Colin, Jean-Marie Girault, Michel Chauty, Pierre Noe, and Pierre Marzin (second ordinary 1977-1978 session of the Senate; meeting of 29 June 1978, No 486).
- 28. Two short speeches by Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy: 20 September 1982 at the opening of the IHEDN's 35th term, and 3 December 1982 at the inauguration of the underground parking facility in Chartres. Statement by President Francois Mitterrand during the "Hour of Truth" program on Antenne 2 [TV channel], 16 November 1983.
- 29. Interview with Colonel Bouffandeau, General Secretariat for National Defense, Thursday 21 February 1985.
- 30. A noteworthy example of this is the Saarland Hospital in Saarbrucken, FRG. French governmental authorities could take this apparently pioneer facility as a pattern.
- 31. Report by Mme Florence d'Harcourt, op. cit., p 126 (decree of 1 September 1972).
- 32. Decree No 80-243, 3 April 1982, details the responsibilities and duties of senior defense officials.
- 33. See Mme Florence d'Harcourt's report, op. cit., p 120, for information on the hardening of equipment and technologies against electromagnetic pulses.
- 34. The three principal effects of nuclear weapons are blast, heat, and radioactive fallout. The first two are considerable with A-bombs and H-bombs, reduced with enhanced radiation weapons, and will be decreased 80 percent when third-generation A-bombs become operational. Radioactive fallout is carried and deposited by atmospheric agents.

- 35. Proposals of the French High Committee for Civil Defense ("Advisory Opinion on Government Proposed 1985 Budget", presented by Senator Paul Girod, op. cit., Appendix 3, p 62).
- 36. Law No 82-213, 2 March 1982, pertaining to rights and freedoms of communes, departments, and regions, JOURNAL OFFICIEL, 3 March 1982, and corrigendum in JOURNAL OFFICIEL of 6 March 1982.
- 37. President Mitterrand's remarks at meeting of the association of the prefectoral corps and senior Interior Ministry officials, Wednesday 27 November 1984.
- 38. This term was first used in the Marcellin-Bonnefous report, op. cit., (second ordinary 1979-1980 session of the Senate, Appendix to record of proceedings and debates of 29 April 1980 meeting, No 236, p 97).

8041/9869

CSO: 3519/114

# POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN NEW 'DEFENSE DOCTRINE' VIEWED

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 22 Dec 85 p 8

[Text] The famous "defense doctrine" was put into practice for the first time with the activation of the "total popular participation" in a broad conference of the military and political authorities in Khios, in the heart of the Aegean.

The new defense doctrine, the National Defense policy as it is officially known, was approved last January by KYSEA and since then its implementation began quietly and has gone to a degree that the military considers satisfactory.

In order to implement this military solution, the so-called guidelines of "military planning" have already been studied and circulated. They provide for detailed instructions not only for the military, but for police authorities, nome prefects, township mayors, etc. as to how to deploy personnel in case of danger, for a better and more coordinated distribution of equipment and resources on hand, or to be put at their disposal, so that the resulting defensive capabilities will be the best possible. The military has already been given guidelines while at the same time a group of staffers has undertaken the study of the institution of total popular participation in the defense, especially in the border areas. The first experiment of this institution took place in Khios and new "exercises" will follow in the remaining border areas and, of course, on all of the islands of the Aegean.

In the meantime, citizen participation in the defense of their own region consists mainly of the premise that "everyone can contribute with whatever means he has at his disposal and whatever capability he has to the defense of his country, as long as he operates in coordination and under the guidance of the military and civil leadership." However, the plan of popular participation does not include the arming of citizens (at least in the exercise phases) nor does it foresee the reconstitution of the TEA [National Defense Battalions] which, according to an administration statement, have been definitely abolished.

The subject of providing weapons to citizens has been of considerable concern to the staffers who, after long hours of deliberation, have reached the conclusion that providing weapons in time of peace is not possible and the training of citizens in the use of new weapons will take place only during mobilization exercises, enough of which were conducted this year.

The new defense doctrine in essence defines the basic aims of Greek foreign policy and the national defense policy connected with it in the context of the present political-military conditions, both in our immediate area as well as in a broader sense.

With regard to the rationale of the new doctrine, the only thing that was made known and has not been classified "secret" is simply that the military articles in existence since 1974 have been codified into a single text in order to make possible their implementation at any moment and mainly to identify the operational needs for modern weapons for the next decade.

Included in the new plan of the Civil National Defense are the new training methods of the Armed Forces.

Of course, the new defense doctrine provides for the change in the manner in which officers are promoted (the bill has laready been drafted and submitted to the Chamber of Deputies) in order to make the Armed Forces more streamlined.

Finally, with the implementation of the new defense doctrine, the training provided in the officers schools of the Armed Forces has been upgraded on the basis of international levels of high performance and the number of admissions in the schools of career non-commissioned officers was increased, 2,000 volunteer enlisted personnel was signed up and living conditions of the conscripts were improved considerably through special programs, especially for those who serve in the border areas.

9731

CSO: 3521/79

PORTUGAL

GOVERNMENT, MILITARY IN DISAGREEMENT OVER 1986 BUDGET

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 24 Dec 85 p 5

[Commentary by B.T.]

[Text] The Armed Forces budget for 1986 continues to generate disagreements between the government and the military chiefs, well informed sources have assured 0 DIABO.

The budget figures are dividing the two branches, which have a different view of the needs. The military feel their budget should be about 180 million contos, to ensure the functioning of the institution and the total fulfillment of its national defense and NATO missions. The military chiefs are, however, prepared to reduce their budget demands to about 135 million contos, considering this the minimum level to avoid a rupture.

For its part, the government wants to allocate only 85 million contos to the Armed Forces, and it would be Very difficult to sell the government's financial officials on the idea of even 100 million contos.

The military demands arise from an overall vision of the needs of the Armed Forces, the modernization plans and the optimization of resource managament.

The government's position on this matter derives from general guidelines with regard to the budget. In the first place, the government wants to contain the rate of inflation, on the order of 14 percent—a goal which, incidentally, is jeopardized by some roadblocks in the 1985 Supplementary Budget. In the second place, if the government is to achieve its defined goal (14-percent inflation rate), budget estimates must be stabilized in relation to 1985. The government issued guidelines to the various departments that the sectoral budgets should not exceed the allocations for this fiscal year. This guideline, which the government does not want to abandon, would be closely watched by the executive and, if it is not observed, administrative penalties might even be imposed.

Given this picture, political circles are asking how the government will react to the demands of the military chiefs. The military position is not new, since in the drafting of the 1985 budget—according to our information—the military sought to increase their budget allocations, to the great anguish

of Alipic Dias, secretary of state for the budget. O DIABO also learned that the Supplemental Budget, which the parliament will vote on in early January, does not resolve the problem either. It provides only slightly more than 2 million contos for the Armed Forces General Staff [EMGFA], a ludicrous figure as the supposed compensation for the 1986 budget.

## Government-CEMGFA Contacts

The military chiefs and the government have been engaged in contacts and negotiations regarding this matter for more than 3 weeks. In one of the latest meetings, 0 DIABO has learned, Defense Minister Leonardo Ribeiro de Almaida conveyed the concerns of the military chiefs to the government, through the finance minister and the prime minister. The issue was raised again recently in a meeting of the Superior Council of National Defense, but only from the standpoint of sounding out positions.

The military asked for a meeting with the prime minister, which took place last week, and sought to explain the problem to him.

One of the major projects in the renovation of the Armed Forces—the frigate project—could even be in jeopardy now. According to our information, if the budget allocation for the Armed Forces is maintained, it could prevent the launching of this project, because financial participation on the Portuguese side would be manifestly impossible.

Reports going around in army circles admit the possibility that the military chiefs could disavow their responsibility for national defense if their minimum budget demands are not met. The military could sign over this responsibility, even if not publicly, to the politicians.

## Minister Challenged

O DIABO has also learned that the military are now concerned about the positions taken by Minister Leonardo Ribeiro de Almeida. There are those in the military who think that the minister is not the ideal personality to defend their positions to the government. We have been assured, however, that there is no possibility that they will pressure the prime minister to replace the defense minister—which corresponds somewhat to Cavaco Silva's intention not to meddle with the executive branch for the near future.

Some military leaders may even have made their position known when Leonardo Ribeiro de Almeida was named to the defense post. O DIABO learned that Cavaco Silva received some letters from military officers in this regard at that time (the letters were unsigned, for reasons of military discipline).

According to our information, those letters may have led Cavaco Silva to pressure Figuriredo Lopes to stay on as secretary of state for defense and to give up his announced intention not to remain in the government. According to our sources, from the experience of the pravious government, Figuriredo Lopes would handle military contacts more deftly.

To conclude, there is still the idea of open dissension between the military chiefs and the government regarding the budget, which also raises the general question of the situation of the defense minister. The 1986 State Budget will go to the parliament and there it will be seen who imposed his will on whom, or if there were mutual concessions.

6362 CSO: 3542/61

NAVAL CAPTAIN SEES SUB VIOLATIONS AS TRAINING FOR SABOTAGE

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 23 Jan 86 pp 1, 6

[Article by Lars Christiansson: "Security Policy Failure"]

[Text] "Our security policy has failed. Foreign submarine units operate in our waters in spite of our defense efforts."

These words were spoken by Captain Goran Frisk in the course of a panel discussion arranged by the National Defense Society Wednesday evening. The head of the Foreign Ministry's political section, Jan Eliasson, also took part in the discussion of Sweden's security policy and the submarine threat.

Goran Frisk, who is the commanding officer of one of the naval vessels participating in submarine reconnaissance, characterized the continuing submarine violations as "war preparations aimed at Sweden." He said the motive behind the submarine violations is to "create an opportunity of launching a surprise attack against Sweden."

Knocking Out Defenses

After going through the pattern of submarine violations since the Uto incident in 1980, when submarines began to act more offensively, up to the present, with minisubs and foreign frogmen forming part of the picture, he touched on the goal of the operations.

Frisk said that one of the aims of the activity is to be able to knock out total defense facilities, mobilization supplies, telecommunications facilities, ammunition dumps, minelaying forces and radar and signal surveillance installations.

He added that another aim could be to find initial deployment sites in Swedish waters for nuclear-armed submarines and submarines armed with conventional missiles.

The captain said that underwater operations take place often and last for several days in a row, occurring along the entire coastline from Haparanda to Stromstad. He also said that "our opponents are capable and have good crews" and that they are much more cautious now than they used to be.

"So far the opponent has not resorted to armed force," Frisk commented.

He said that "we are still not threatening enough to make the other side cancel or reduce the level of operations." With reference to the depleted Swedish fleet Frisk said that "our opponent must have concluded that Sweden has abandoned a large part of its territorial waters." He rejected any allegation that during the submarine hunts the Swedish Navy had not been tough enough in moving against the foreign subs and said:

"This is no Sunday school we are running. This is a combat assignment," said Frisk, who felt that the reason why no armed efforts had been made for a long time is that the contacts that have been made with foreign submarines have been too brief to permit the use of weapons.

The captain said that to provide a "reasonable" deterrent and thus put an end to the submarine incursions would require four sub-hunting forces instead of the one in existence today. He advocated setting this as a goal which could be achieved in 5 years. It would cost 10 billion kronor.

The chief of the Foreign Ministry [UD] political section, Jan Eliasson, explained that UD stands behind the conclusion of the Defense Committee and the Submarine Defense Committee that the submarine violations represent preliminary stages in military operational planning. He rejected Frisk's statement that Swedish security policy has failed.

## Tough Measures

"Our policy has not failed just because we were unable to force any subs to the surface. We must continue our efforts in various ways using both defense policy and foreign policy methods," said Eliasson who felt that these two instruments complement each other.

He also said that UD is studying the possibility that the submarine intrusions are connected with the increased activity by the great powers in northern Europe and is comparing the activity here with that in other parts of the world that are also exposed to submarine violations. Eliasson mentioned northern Europe and Southeast Asia.

The chief of UD's political section said that any allegation that Sweden had behaved weakly in dealing with the intruding submarines or had failed to use strong diplomatic protests when the nationality of the intruders could be established was "preposterous."

When he stated that the Swedish rules concerning the use of weapons against intruding submarines were tough by international standards and provided a lot of leeway for the use of live ammunition in internal waters, Captain Frisk agreed with him.

6578

CSO: 3650/126

SERIOUS COST OVERRUNS REPORTED IN COASTAL CORVETTE ORDER

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 23 Jan 86 p 8

[Article by Erik Liden: "Corvette Price Up 200 Million Kronor"]

[Text] The four coastal corvettes the Swedish Navy ordered just before Christmas will cost at least 200 million kronor more than estimated.

In December the government gave the Defense Materiel Command, FMV, permission to spend 1.018 billion kronor on the order at Karlskrona Shipyard.

Just a month later an urgent need has arisen for spare parts, maintenance equipment and complementary electronic installations which the Navy did not specify in its original request for bids. For various reasons, including economic reasons, FMV feels it is advantageous to buy the spare parts, etc. at this time. The Navy must now include the 200 million kronor in this year's budget planning if the government authorizes the purchase.

Obvious Irritation

There was a lively discussion on the cost of the coastal corvettes in 1985 when the people in charge of the project in the Defense Ministry felt that these four sub-hunting platforms would be too expensive. Thus there is obvious irritation in the Defense Ministry concerning the additional 200 million kronor, which did not appear in earlier plans.

But the government may be forced to give FMV the green light to buy the necessary spare parts now. At the end of the 1980's the Navy will get six coastal corvettes and two somewhat smaller ones have already been equipped and are on a trial run in the Baltic. The new ones will cost around 300 million kronor apiece.

Six more coastal corvettes will be needed in the 1990's but there is definite competition from a new long-range surface missile for the Coastal Artillery. It is based on surface missile 15 which is now delivered to the fleet's 12 missile boats and was developed for the JAS-39/Gripen plane. The Coastal Artillery will replace its old 08 missiles with the 15 type.

Anti-submarine defenses will improve slowly but surely. The Defense Materiel Command has just received bids on new sonar equipment intended to protect vulnerable sea approaches via continuous monitoring of underwater traffic. Delivery will be made sometime in 1987.

6578

CSO: 3650/126

### BRIEFS

YOUNG OFFICERS LEAVING MILITARY--Gavle (TT)--The Swedish defense system is tilting toward the older generation. Young officers are leaving for more attractive jobs in other areas. At I-14 in Gavle a study is being made of the 30 young officers who have left the regiment in the last 3 years. That is twice the normal level of resignations. "We think the regimental leaders have done much too little to keep people here. Something radical must be done. The first step is to make a careful study of the reasons why they are leaving," Rolf Svanbom, local representative of the Swedish Officers' Union, told the newspaper ARBEIDERBLADET. The tendency is the same all over the country. Young officers are leaving the army for civilian jobs. [Text] [Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 22 Jan 86 p 10] 6578

CSO: 3650/126

DENMARK

BANKS USE MERGERS TO COUNTER FOREIGN COMPETITION

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 14 Dec 85 Sec 3 p 2

[Article by Hugo Gården]

[Text] Drastic changes are about to take place within the banking sector. The largest banks are expected to expand by way of mergers to counter foreign competition.

It is foreign competition that has caused the Danish Bank to carry through strategic plans with respect to the Provincial Bank.

During the Kronebank crisis, the country's largest bank purchased Provincial Bank shares, and after the takeover by the Provincial Bank of the Kronebank, the purhcases of shares continued. In the spring, the Danish Bank announced that it had purchased 17 percent of the shares. That was not enough for the Danish Bank to dominate the Provincial Bank, but enough to enable the Danish Bank to prevent decisions which were not acceptable to the headquarters in Copenhagen. In other words, the Danish Bank wanted to prevent others, for example banks or insurance companies, from merging with the Provincial Bank and jeopardizing the leading position of the Danish Bank in the banking world.

It does not matter whether the holdings are 17 percent or 25 percent, as far as influence is concerned. But by holding 25 percent of the shares, the bank becomes eligible for a tax exemption, corresponding to a subsidiary company exemption, in that dividends become exempt from taxation.

It therefore makes sense to acquire a 25 percent holding interest. A few days ago, the Danish Bank announced the purchase, which has taken place gradually.

The Real Purpose of the Share Purchases

It now turns out, however, that the Danish Bank did not only have strategy and preventive measures in mind. The bank had an offensive in mind. It

finds a major expansion in the coming years necessary, and a merger with the Provincial Bank may be a step in that direction. It will only be possible to expand by approximately 50 percent in a few years if it takes place either by way of mergers or through the provision of considerable amounts of fresh capital, and, in both cases, the expansion will hurt other banks and savings banks.

Tage Andersen, director of the Danish Bank, tells BERLINGSKE TIDENDE that it may become necessary to obtain a market share of approximately 30 percent domestically in order to be able to compete with foreign banks. He stresses that a merger may only take place under an agreement with the Provincial Bank. He does not intend to interfere in the matters of the Provincial Bank, nor to demand seats on the board of directors. This having been said, however, it may become profitable for both banks to merge in the course of 5-10 years.

Tage Andersen says that the Danish Bank does not have actual plans on the short view to seek a merger with the Provincial Bank, but in 5-10 years a merger may become advantageous for both parties.

The Two Banks Suit Each Other

"We suit each other. We can say it in the same way as when the Provincial Bank wanted to merge with the Kronebank that the two banks structurally and as far as their branch networks were concerned suited each other. The same thing applies to us and the Provincial Bank, also as far as our foreign branch networks are concerned," Tage Andersen says.

It is not the fear of financial supermarkets with new company formations between banks and, for example, insurance companies that troubles the Danish Bank. Tage Andersen does not find that it is in that area that the battle has to be fought. The reason why the Danish Bank is interested in the Provincial Bank is that the Danish Bank finds it most decisive what happens within the banking sector. It is in order to be able to hold their own in the severe competition during the coming years in that area, not least on the part of foreign banks, that the major Danish banks will have to expand. "The Banks have to be on the move constantly," he says.

Provincial Bank Does not Rule out Possibility of Merger

Jens Otto Veile, director of the Provincial Bank, takes the share purchases on the part of the Danish Bank calmly. The purchases were expected. He points to the fact that the two banks have previously had a close cooperation. If we have to merge, it will have to take place on the terms of the Provincial Bank.

"Of course, I do not want to rule out the possibility that there may be a merger between the two banks within the next 5-10 years. One cannot rule out anything within the banking sector," Jens Otto Veile says.

"I expect the large banks to become markedly larger than they are now, and that things will become difficult for the medium-sized banks. The EDP costs

are extremely high, and, for that reason, the advantages of large-scale operations are of great importance. Large American banks are able to set up electronic systems throughout the world, and if Danish banks have to do the same thing to serve Danish enterprises all over the world, it will cost a lot of money, and that is why structural changes in this country cannot be ruled out," Jens Otto Veile says.

Race Between Two Largest Banks

Recent years have seen a race between the Danish Bank and the second largest bank, the Commercial Bank. The most recent monthly balance sheets show that the Commercial Bank is now right behind the Danish Bank with a balance of 102 billion kroner as against 104 billion kroner.

"I agree with Tage Andersen that it may become necessary for the major banks to grow enormously. If one looks at cost developments compared to earning ability, one realizes the importance of 'reefing the sails.' In order for the major banks to continue to operate in the international markets, they need to expand, and I predict very large changes in the banking structure in this country, either by way of voluntary mergers or by some banks giving up," says Bendt Hansen.

Whether the reduction in the number of banks will take place at an even more rapid rate than expected by Bendt Hansen will depend on the competition across the borders in the financial market. If the activities across the borders are stepped up, the changes within the banking sector will be accelerated. It may also force the banks to launch a number of new initiatives.

"It should not be forgotten that there will be no major profits due to appreciation in the coming years. Consolidation thus has to take place in the area of operation or by way of capital supplies, and that makes the situation difficult for many banks," says Bendt Hansen.

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CSO: 3613/45

ECONOMIC

RECENT DECLINE IN UNEMPLOYMENT VIEWED

Paris LE MONDE in French 18 Jan 86 p 29

[Article by Alain Lebaube: "Number of Unemployed Down by 85,000 Between January and December 1985"]

[Text] There has been an important development in the unemployment situation. The decline in unemployment in December made it possible to end 1985 on a optimistic note. It is likely that this tendency will continue.

If this is the case, it will then be possible to see a reversal in the situation, the first recorded since 1974. The reduction in unemployment of 3.5 percent in the raw data, as well as in seasonally corrected data (down by about 85,000 unemployed) between the beginning and end of 1985 seems to foreshadow this change.

Have the employment situation and the structure of unemployment considerably changed? It now appears that in response to the increase in unemployment job uncertainty has risen to an impressive extent. Changes in the total number of workers, held down for a long time by the "social treatment" of unemployment, are taking place more rapidly. A considerable number of job openings has developed, compensating for the loss of other jobs.

An expert has commented: "The shock absorbers are smaller." He recognized that, although that made it possible to take advantage of the slightest change in the economic situation, it could equally work in the opposite direction and at the same speed. This observer, who is close to the government, also said: "Social measures as a whole have led to changes in the labor market but have not prevented its natural evolution. Everything is ready for an economic upturn."

However, some risks remain, such as the increasingly noticeable division of the labor market in two-the trend toward dualism-between those who benefit from a stable situation and those who are condemned to the endless ups and downs of unemployment. Some people say that it would be better to deal with this dual trend rather than continue to deny it exists. Other people think

that some answers have been found, particularly thanks to the TUC [Useful Community Work] program (189,000 positions filled in December) and that new areas of employment, which are certainly still not fully defined, are emerging.

For example, there are the companies set up by people looking for work. Some 70,048 unemployed workers have benefited from the assistance provided in such cases, or twice as many as in 1985. There are various associations which, in many cases (up to 80 percent, according to Service-Association), wind up providing jobs to young people involved in the TUC program. There are activities which have been set up to respond to easily soluble social needs. Furthermore, following the adoption of the decentralization program, local and regional government authorities have had to recruit new workers to handle their new responsibilities.

has stabilized over the year (330,000 more Thus, although the rate of job 10 people, in adjusted figures, regis ered as having no job in December 1985, or 2.1 percent more in one month), those leaving the unemployment lists of the ANPE continue to increase in massive numbers. With 453,100 job requests registered or cancelled, in corrected figures (up by 11.5 percent in 1 month and up by 33.8 percent in 1 year), levels have been reached which fortunately are close to job placements handled by the ANPE (up by 15.7 percent in 1 year) or jobs obtained by the unemployed themselves (up by 16 percent in 1 The same phenomenon must have functioned among the 183,030 who were dropped from the job register for "failure to respond to a check of the jobless rolls or did not appear for a job appointment" (up by 27.7 percent in 1 month or 50.9 percent in 1 year), even though discouragement, reflected in the case of people who no longer are trying to find a job, increased dangerously (up by 181 percent in 1 year). All of the various job training programs are working successfully and they explain, in many cases, the substantial drop in unemployment among young people under 25 years of age (down 13.8 percent for young men and down 13.1 percent for young women in 1 year).

## "Camouflaged Unemployment"

Similarly, we may note the main features involved in the reestablishment of the job market. Job dismissals for economic reasons only account for 15.3 percent of the cases of new registrations of unemployed workers, while the completion of longer term or temporary job contracts accounted for 46.3 percent of the new registrations. The volume of days paid for partial unemployment, a good sign of the economic situation, is tending to decline (it rose by 17.1 percent in 1 month but went down by 19.6 percent for the year), with 853,000 days paid in this way.

Lionel Stoleru, with his monthly ARIES scale, has estimated the "real number" of unemployed at about 3,040,000, up by 4,400 over the previous month. He said: "It has often been said that we may be leaving delayed action bombs lying around, but it is the very opposite which threatens to happen." The

former secretary of state declared: "The substantial drop in the official unemployment index is a case of end of the year camouflage, largely reflecting those who have been dropped from the job register for lack of interest or people engaged in the TUC program."

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CSO: 3519/121

ECONOMIC

## DELORS ASSESSES SOCIALIST ECONOMIC RECORD

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 15-21 Nov 85 pp 28-29

[Interview with Jacques Delors, former minister of economy and current president of the European Commission, by Philippe Alexandre and Georges Valance; date and place not specified; first paragraph is LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR introduction]

[Text] The president of the European Commission here explains to Philippe Alexandre and Georges Valance why the idea of "rupture"--yesterday with capitalism and tomorrow with socialism--strikes him as disturbing for France.

Philippe Alexandre: In the reactions to "En sortir ou pas" (Footnote 1) ("En sortir ou pas," by Philippe Alexandre and Jacques Delors, Grasset, 231 pp, 75 francs), one sentence appears frequently: "Jacques Delors is engaging in an exercise in self-criticism which presupposes that the French have short memories"—notably in that entire passage where the excessive burden of compulsory deductions, those lead weights on the economy, and so on are mentioned. The book's readers will say: "But after all, it was under his reign that the tax burden was increased, and now he is arguing for a reduction in taxes." This shows how difficult your undertaking, which in this book consists of blaming yourself to some extent, is.

Jacques Delors: It is always dangerous to extract a single passage as reflecting the tone of a book. The purpose of the book is to demonstrate that if they get rid of their provincialist attitude and reject a civil cold war both in politics and in social relations, the French are capable of getting out of the crisis. To prove that, it was necessary to present a "balance sheet," showing both the positive and the negative aspects, of the Left's economic and social action—and to learn its lessons for the future.

Ph. A.: But aren't you bothered by that accusation concerning a somewhat belated self-criticism?

J. D.: In that examination of France's strengths and weaknesses, it was not a matter of my extricating myself, so to speak. I support what the Socialists have done. But it was useful for me to recall some of the debates that took place within the government so as to clarify people's thinking.

If some people think that I was wrong to remain in the government, it would be well for them to reflect on the dilemma facing anyone in a responsible position. It is true that I sometimes accepted certain decisions, but only after fighting to have them changed. On other occasions, my proposals were accepted. I have not reconstructed history after the fact. In political life, one if often faced with a simple choice: either one slams the door and has no further influence on events or one remains and tries to change their direction. It is a problem of individual conscience and also one of solidarity in government action. But not just that: the citizens must be able to judge one in the light of the stakes and the debates.

Ph. A.: There is a very widespread idea today that no economic alternation is possible. If the Right returns to power, it will be forced to pursue the same policy, in general outline, that we have now. But despite those constraints, won't the Right be compelled inevitably to promise that it will pursue a policy radically different from the one that has been pursued until now?

J. D.: In his latest book (Footnote 2) ("La Faute a Rousseau," Seuil, 256 pp, 85 francs), Jacques Julliard expresses our apprehensions very well when he writes: "The obsession with a clean sweep remains the French sickness above all else." In other words, when I hear about a "rupture with socialism," I have the worst fears for my country.

The fact is that for the years from 1986 to 1988, the negative effects of a civil cold war would be much greater than what might be objectively produced in the eyes of a leftwing voter by a leftist policy or in the eyes of a rightwing voter by a rightist policy. That is the thesis of the book. must change our behavior in order to move toward smooth alternation and show the citizens that what separates the Right and the Left is their different points of view concerning often very important questions but that they are not two radically conflicting universes, unless the two extremes are considered. That being said, the Socialists have achieved results--regarded as very positive by all foreign observers -- in the fight against inflation, for the recovery of foreign trade, and for modernization of the production apparatus. The French have accepted sacrifices to reach that point. Politics must not, as a result of that climate of civil cold war or an excessive passion for revenge, reduce to nothing the progress that has been made at such high cost (notably through unemployment).

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Let us talk a little about the future. We are 4 months away from the legislative elections. In your opinion, what kinds of measures and decisions could the Socialist government still adopt to reverse engines and go into the elections in a better position?

J. D.: The French also have good sense. They can assess the radical improvement in their economy, without which nothing else would be possible. They are also very attached to an indispensable platform of social gains brought about by the Left.

Besides the plans for the future on the economic and social levels, the French will have to take a stand on such basic topics as tolerance, acceptance of

others, and solidarity. Because there is no political option that does not involve choices concerning a certain concept of the will to live together and of equal opportunity—the foundation of concrete freedoms.

It would also be interesting to think about measures enabling the workers to participate in the capital of state-owned firms. One may consider it laughable to own 10 shares of Saint-Gobain or 10 shares of the General Company, but behind that there is a change in attitude: it would be a useful extension of the government's successful actions since 1981 to associate savings more closely with investment, which is the creator of wealth and jobs.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Do you mean denationalization through employee shareholding?

- J. D.: Or rather through employee savings. I have always supported the idea that those large industrial firms should be 51-percent nationalized. My opinion has not changed. Besides, as we explained in the book, there would be a great deal to fear from a sudden wave of denationalizations. The result would be disorder and uncertainty, which are incompatible with continued recovery. Another fruitful idea would be to give a boost to the policy of continuing education to enable the greatest number of people to learn new technologies, because economic success depends on the training and motivation of the workers. There is a topic on the subject of recovery for negotiation between employers and unions.
- Ph. A.: You often say that living together will be possible to achieve because the Constitution is very flexible: you say that as in the fable, it is both bird and mouse. It is a fact, however, that the Constitution has been applied in only one way for the past 23 years. Do you believe that its application can be changed with the same man as president? And simply because of the outcome of an election?
- J. D.: On that subject, a preliminary statement needs to be made. I am not beating the drums for anyone. Since this book came out, some people have said that it was part of a calculated offensive in which each regiment—including the Delors regiment—had its allotted task. It was not that at all. It is the thinking of a man who is making his thoughts known. It is the fruit of collaboration between two free minds. We wrote it with humor, that is true, but also with a passion for the future of our country. In the mail I receive, I note that the book interests and even provokes people and makes them think—and not just people who are keen on political life. Yes, I hope that we will be able to live together, because the choice is dramatically simple: either civil cold war will grab hold of French political life and there will be rupture, revenge, and a hardening of positions in defiance of the hard realities of the economy and unemployment, or there will be cohabitation that can be based, moreover, on a broad consensus concerning institutions, foreign policy, and defense. In the latter case, we will be able to continue our recovery.

Ph. A.: Yes, but there is one point on which you do not enjoy consensus, and that is the fact that in March 1986, the presidential battle will begin.

- J. D.: Here we come to something that has greatly shocked some of my closest friends: the criticism of institutional imbalances favoring Elysee Palace in the broad sense. I would like to explain. It is not men that are at issue but the system. I do not want comrades in the president's entourage to feel that they are the targets. It is the system and its implacable logic. I have observed this twice in my life: under Georges Pompidou and under Francois Mitterrand. The imbalance of power dilutes responsibilities and gives rise to misunderstandings. This must be remedied. Good sense demands it. one accept the idea that the presidential election should monopolize all political life? How can one resign oneself to a practice that leads political men of very good quality to say: "We cannot exist until we have a symbol"? And that symbol is the fact of rallying around a candidate 5 years before his term is even up. Politics becomes a spectacle whose ties with daily life are no longer seen. And when the political system becomes illegible, democracy is weakened and public-spiritedness declines.
- LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: On the subject of public-spiritedness and democracy, the first effects of the proportional voting system are scarcely encouraging: the citizens are witnessing insane political squabbling over the makeup of lists and, along with that, the rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen.
- J. D.: The Le Pen phenomenon would have occurred in any case, with or without proportional voting. It is due to the existence of an extreme rightwing trend in our historical tradition—a trend that is growing because of certain social realities. As for the rest, I feel that the decision to adopt the proportional voting system came too late. If it had been made early in 1982, it would have allowed the rainbow of French opinion to be expressed in all its diversity. When I talk about proportional voting, what I am demanding, for example, is the opportunity for Christian social, Christian democratic, and radical socialist trends of opinion to exist. I cannot refuse that same right to the extreme Left or the extreme Right, if they exist. One must be logical.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: If proportional voting had been adopted earlier, would you have formed a Christian Social Party?

J. D.: I simply said, by way of illustration, that by joining forces, between 10 and 15 percent of the French could be rallied to the Christian social tradition. But I repeat that I am remaining in the Socialist Party, where several political leanings, including the position close to my own, coexist.

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CSO: 3519/113

ECONOMIC

## POPULATION DEVELOPMENTS AFFECT ECONOMIC FORECASTS

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 1 Jan 86 p 21

[Excerpts] Under economic or cultural criteria, Greece should not be part of a developed Europe. Under demographic criteria, however, there is no doubt: it is one of the European countries that is experiencing a significant slow-down in population growth. As a special OECD study reports, the 15 to 64 age group of the population—that is, the actual active population—will continue to increase in Greece at a yearly rate of 0.5 percent from 1985 to 1990, but from 1990 to 2000 it will decrease at a yearly rate of 0.1 percent.

Therefore, from 6,426,000 individuals in 1985, it will reach 6,588,000 in 1990 and will decrease slightly to 6,200,000 in the year 2000.

This means that the overall population will continue at a similar or more negative growth rate as the decrease in births is forecast to continue at a rather faster rate than the increase in persons over 65 years of age. In other words, we will just barely go beyond ten million by the year 2000.

The examination of the economic consequences engendered by demographic developments is connected to the effort of forecasting the development of the active population, of the working population. From this point of view, Greece stands out in relation to most industrialized countries and in relation to the poorer countries as well. The percentage of the population in the 15 to 64 age group that constitutes the active population is particularly small: 58.5 percent in 1982, when this percentage was 72.3 in Japan, 67 percent in France, 72 percent in Portugal and 69 percent in Turkey. This too is the reason why it is difficult to project the course that the active population will follow in Greece.

In any case, the low number of people, who, in Greece, have or try to find a job is mainly due to the addition of the small percentage of women: approximately 40 percent of women in the 15 to 64 age group are part of the active population.

Consequently, the development of the active population in Greece up to the year 2000 depends, to a great degree, on the stagnation or changes in certain economic and social structures that kept a great percentage of women out of the workforce. It must also be noted that the percentage of men in the 14 to 64 age group, who belong to the active population, is relatively small in Greece.

The increase in the percentage, and the number of women who work or who are job-hunting is one of the strong trends in demographic developments in Greece. In 1970, 31 percent of women in the "active" ages were working. In 1983 they reached 40 percent. The increase has speeded up in recent years because in 1980 the corresponding percentage was just 33 percent: apparently the economic crisis is sending women into the job market because it is evidently not a simple case of a change in mentality.

The economic developments lead to the weakening of the safety nets, which for many years protected the urban family with one wage-earner. Remittances from abroad--seamen or immigrants--, income from the sale of land and rentals of real estate, the great number of small business activities can be considered the nets that provided financial resources or psychological reasons to prevent the employment of women, in addition to certain retirement benefits for women.

However, the changes that took place in recent years are impressive. During the 1977-1982 period, for which we have trustworthy data, the number of working, salaried women in the urban sector of the economy increased by 27 percent (from 387 to 490 thousand) while the increase of salaried men was only 7 percent (from 1,117 to 1,195 million).

One could, on the other hand, say that the entry of women into the workforce is to a great degree a "proletarization" phenomenon. If the category of "the contributing family members" is excepted, the salaried men in the urban sector represent 67 percent of those employed, while the salaried women represent 83 percent [as published].

If we add that the "proletarization" of women is exclusively connected to the increase in their employment in businesses, restaurants and hotels and public and social services as well as personal services, it is a case of a development that goes along with the increase in unemployment, that is, of the individuals who are seeking employment.

We can therefore conclude that, despite the stagnation of the population of the active ages (between 15 and 64 age group), some increase in the active population is observed, a fact that will create, for the reasons we reported, a long-term trend.

However, how is possible for the economy to face these developments? To what degree will they influence the economy? All the discussions about demographic trends revolve around these questions.

The new data on employment developments show that the active population and fishing have dropped to about 30 percent, that industry employment remains stable at around 29 percent (and in the manufacturing industry a little above 19 percent), while, in the service sector, it has reached 41 percent.

Will this change continue, however? The increase in employment in the service sector is considered by many to be an inevitable and, actually, a desirable development. However, for the economy of Greece at present, this is connected to the stagnation of productive investments and particularly of investments in manufacturing. It actually appears to express attempts at looking for profitmaking business enterprises in services that are characterized by an undisputed dynamism.

On the other hand, the inflation of this sector, and its development by the use of women earning relatively low wages, leads to a more generalized effort to restrain wages and increase productivity even in large public corporations.

The main trend that transpires for the overall active population is, therefore, an increase that is associated with strong pressures in the field of earned wages. Greece is influenced, on the one hand, by European demographic trends, but its job market exerts strong pressures for Third World-type developments.

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CSO: 2135/79

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